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CH4\PTER I 
INTRODUCTION 
Public relations as a recognized science is a product 
of the twentieth century. But the exercise of public rela-
tions dates back into ancient history. 
As early as 490 B~C. one is told of the battle of 
Marathon where 10,000 Athenians defeated the hitherto 
undefeated Persian Army. Pheidippides, the great Greek 
athlete, ran some 28 miles from Marathon to Athens to carry 
the news of the victory to the anxious Athenians. Although 
he dropped dead upon arrival, he had instilled in the spirits 
of the Athenians undreamed of prestige. 
Yet, ancient as is the practice of public relations, 
the military forces of this nation have actively pursued it 
in an organized fashion only during the past two decades. 
For the first few years of what might be called the 
''modern period 11 of military public relations, it was · confined 
to the servicing of news about World War II. It was not until 
the hostilities ceased that any great thought was given to a 
permanent organization and a continuing program. 
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I. CIVILIAN STUDIES 
To set the guidelines for these permanent programs, 
civilian public relations experts were called upon--
persons who had no service connections and who could take 
a detached view--persons, who, through training and ex-
perience, could set up the best possible criteria for 
grading military information. 
2 
Three such studies were conducted on navy information. 
These were preceded by a study on Army information--and 
followed by one of the Defense Department program. 
These studies -.ere submitted, approved, and certain 
elements implemented. 
II. THE PROBLEM 
No one, however, has ever attempted to ascertain in 
what areas these reports overlapped and in which fields 
they were in disagreement. And, more importantly, no one 
has related a consensus of these recommendations to the 
Navy's information program and organization. In this paper 
that will now be done. 
III. PUBLIC RELATIONS SIGNIFICANCE 
The thesis will discuss and ascertain the mission for 
Navy information and public relatione in this nuclear age--
and how this mission and the public information organization 
has developed. 
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Twenty years ago the Navy's Office of Information 
did not exist, its birth coming shortly before Pearl Harbor. 
The first mission of this new organization was keeping the 
public informed of naval activities during the "neutrality 
war" of 1941, followed by, of course, the fortunes of warfare 
after December 7, 1941. 
By 1952, the mission of the Navy informational program 
had evolved, according to the u. s. Navy Public Information 
Manual, into: 
Inform the public and the naval service concerning 
the Navy as an instrument of national policy and security, 
and, the activities of the Navy, as compatible with mil-
itary security, and, the responsibilities and participa-
tion of naval personnel as United States citizens under 
the American concept of government and society.l 
Today, keeping the public informed is still the backbone 
of navy information. But keeping them informed of what: 
deterrent forces, retaliatory strength, the need for seapower, 
guided missiles, earth satellites? 
And, today, the mission of navy information cannot be 
limited to just keeping the public informed. For today 
military strength is all encompassing--it is not confined to 
liberty ports and training stations. Today there are jets 
screaming overhead, Niki batteries in backyards, satellites 
gliding across the skies. Community relations have taken on 
new significance. 
1~. s. Navy Public Information Manual (Washington: 
Government Printing Office, 1953), p. 3. 
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Today, also, highly trained technicians must be kept 
in the Navy to man the intricate mechanisms that release the 
new nuclear weapons. So, internal relations have taken on 
new significance. 
4 
And, finally, to keep this vast new project of navy 
information functioning proficiently, a potent personnel 
program must be developed within the public information field. 
The new mission for navy information must include, 
therefore, keeping the public informed, community relations, 
internal relations and personnel planning. And, everywhere 
the basic mission of the Navy must be understood. 
IV. ANALYSIS OF AREA TO BE STUDIED 
Five civilian studies of military information were 
used in this thesis. These were supplemented by a Navy-
civilian study and a book on Marine Corps information. 
In addition, research delved into testimony by the 
Chiefs of Information before congressional committees--as 
such testimony pertained to the subject. It was not the aim 
of this thesis, however, to go into the Congressional aspects 
of the public information programs as that has been the sub-
ject of a thesis by Lieutenant Commander Robert P. Brett, USN. 2 
2Robert P. Brett, "A Study of Current Congressional 
Opinion on Military Information Practices and Policies 
(unpublished Master's thesis, Boston University, Boston, 
1958). 
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5 
Interviews were also conducted with Mr. Laurence 0. 
Pratt--author of two of the studies--and with Rear Admiral 
Edmund B. Taylor, USN, until recently the Navy Chief of 
Information. Conferences were conducted, in addition, with 
staff members of the Offices of Information of the Department 
of Defense, Navy, Army and Air Force. 
V. METHODS USED 
Library research and research concerning the civilian 
reports mentioned above were accomplished as well as the 
oral interviews with the individuals also previously stated. 
VI. THE APPROACH 
In order to fully understand the significance of the 
current and proposed mission and organization for Navy 
information and public relations, it is necessary to first 
define what public relations and public information are. 
Second, the reader should be made aware of the development of 
military information throughout the history of the United 
States. The next section of this thesis, therefore, will 
trace the family tree of military information with particular 
emphasis on the Navy. 
Inasmuch as the Navy 1 s information program must be 
closely related to the Navy 1 s mission itself, there will be 
a discussion of the New Nuclear Navy. 
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One last preparatory chapter is necessary prior to the 
study of the civilian reportso This will outline and discuss 
the current mission and organization of the Navy information 
program. 
Following this, the recommendations of the civilian 
studies will be examined. The paper will be limited to the 
areas covered by the studies. However, occasionally 
recommendations of the author will be added, if appropriate. 
Each of these recommendations will be related to the 
mission for Navy information in the nuclear age. 
Not every one of the recommendations made in the 
civilian studies will be listedo This is for two reasons: 
first, several are no longer pertinent; and, second, many 
have already been implemented by the Navyo Several of the 
recommendations will be discussed under two or more headings. 
For example, inspections of reserve public relations activities 
will be discussed under "public relations of the reserve" and 
under "plans and inspections." 
The end result of this thesis is to outline the 
recommendations of the civilian studies which should--or 
should not--be implemented and their relationship to the 
Navy's informational program and organizationo 
First, however, it is necessary to define public 
relations and other related termso 
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VII. DEFINITIONS 
To eliminate confusion which might arise by certain 
terms germane to military information, the following terms 
are defined: 
1650 specialist - The Navy uses a "number series" to define 
the prime qualifications of its officers. A 1650 would be 
a regular Navy public information specialist who would at 
all times be assigned to a public information billet. 
PIO specialist - the same. 
1655 specialist - the same, except a naval reserve officer. 
PIO - short for public information officer 
Journalist - an enlisted man--or woman--who, as a petty 
officer, is rated in the enlisted PIO category. 
Chief of Information - The Admiral in charge of naval 
information. 
CHINFO - short for Chief of Information; or, for the Office 
of Informationo 
Department of the Navy - all naval ships, stations, bureaus 
and officeso 
Navy Department - the bureaus and offices comprising the 
Washington headquarters. 
7 
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CHAPTER II 
PUBLIC RELATIONS 
I. DEFINITION 
A study of twelve public relations books reveals 
a dozen definitions of public relations. None conflict. 
But neither are two alike. For public relations is 
defined by what it accomplishes, how it accomplishes, 
and by what people think it should accomplish. 
The extent of this confusion and perhaps even the 
danger of it is illustrated by a survey in which 2,000 of 
the leading public relations executives and practitioners 
of the country submitted their definitions of public 
relations. As reported by Glenn and Denny Griswold:l 
A wide variety of concepts were revealed by replies 
which characterized public relations as a science, a 
system, an art, a process, a function, a relationship, 
a humanizing genius, a term, a business, a profession, 
a method, an activity, a program, a pattern of behavior, 
a morale force, a combination of media, et cetera. 
The top three definitions were chosen by a committee. 
The first place award was assigned to the definition sub-
mitted by J. C. Seidel, public relations director, Division 
of Housing, State of New York. It was: 
Public relatione is the continuing process by which 
management endeavors to obtain the goodwill and under-
standing of its customers, it employees and the public 
at large; inwardly through self-analysis and correction, 
outwardly through all means of expression.2 
1Glenn Griswold and Denny Griswold (ed.), Your Public 
Relations (New York: Funk & Wagnalls Co., 1948), p. 4 
2Ibid. 
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The third place winner, however, is better for 
adapting to the Navy program: 
Public relations is the art of bringing about public 
understanding which breeds greater public confidence for 
any indivudual or organization.~ 
II. PUBLIC RELATIONS INSPIRES CONFIDENCE 
The American public has always been suspicious of 
9 
big organizations concerning which they know little. Constant 
derogatory references to ''Pentagon Brass 11 and the Pentagon, 
in general, can in the long run reduce the nation's confidence 
in its military leadership. Therefore, military public 
relations must stimulate public understanding in order to 
cultivate better public confidence. 
Canfield states public relations is, first, a 
philosophy of management--an attitude of mind which places 
the interest of people first in all matters pertaining to 
the conduct of the organization. 4 But it is not only a 
philosophy and function of management, it is also a technique 
of communication through which the public learns about the 
aims and accomplishments of an organization--namely, the 
Navy. 
The growth of this new profession has paralleled the 
recognition by influential men everywhere that no power can 
3Ibid. 
4Bertrand R. Canfield, Public Relations, Principles, 
Oases, and Problems (Homewood, Illinois: Richard D. Irwin, 
Inc., 1956), p. 5 
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survive unless it has the support of the public. The day 
when tyrants and tycoons said rtthe public be damned" is 
gone. 5 
III. OTHER TERMS 
Many confuse public relations with publicity, press 
agentry, propagandat and advertising. They think of the 
10 
PR man as one who is constantly thinking up stunts to gain 
free publicity. Many an extravaganza has been termed •• just 
another public relations stunt.M 
Cutlip and Center differentiate between the terms as 
follows: 6 
Publicity: the dissemination of information making 
matters public from the point of view of one who wishes 
to inform others. Systematic distribution of informa-
tion about an institution or an individual. 
Press agentry: creation of publicity-worthy events 
and the use of brass bands and barkers, if necessary, 
to attract attention to some person or some thing. 
Propaganda: the organized, systematic spreading of 
a doctrine or the propagation of an idea or a cause~ 
Advertising: the purchase of space in print or time 
on the air to promote the sale of products, the accept-
ance of ideas, or to build institutional good will and 
prestige. Paid publicity. 
The public relations program of the Navy could be said 
to include all of these. For the Navy disseminates informa-
tion; it creates publicity-worthy events such as the 
5Theodore R. Sills and Philip Lesley, Public Relations 
(Chicago: Richard D. Irwin, Inc., 1946), p. 3 
6scott M. Cutlip & Allen H. Center, Effective Public 
Relations (New York: Prentice~Hall Inc., 1952), p. 6 
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International Naval Review; spreads the doctrine of a 
strong naval force; and it uses advertising in recruiting 
drives. 
But they are not public relations• They are merely 
the means to the end. Harlan and Scott perhaps have the 
.shortest definition of public relations. They state it "is 
the a.rt of making friends.tt7 
IV. PUBLIC INFORMATION 
There is one other term which must be defined before 
any discussion of navy public relations. That is "public 
information. tt 
In 1949, the armed forces changed their "public 
relations officers" into "public information officers." 
Congress has defined public information as "the 
11 
act or process of communicating knowledge, to enlighten."8 
The question arises as to where public information 
fits into the public relatione program? It is an adjunct to 
public relations. 
A former commandant of the Armed Forces Information 
School, Rear Admiral Thomas H. Binford, USN, stated: 9 
7Gene Harlan &: Alan Scott, Contemporary Public Rela-
tions {Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey: Prentice-Hall, Ino:;-
1955), p. 4 
8Rlchard M. McCQol Jr. &: John M. Stevens "An Analyeis 
and Evaluation or the Rel!tionsliip Between oivilian Navy-Ihterest 
Groups and the Navy 1 s Public Information Program" (unpublished 
Master's thesis, Boston University, Boston, 1955), p. 2 
9Rear Admiral Thomas H. Binford, USN, "Press Relations• 
(paper read at the Naval War College, Newport, Rhode Island, 
February 12, 1953), p. 5 
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Public information and public relations are distinct 
subjects, but they are not separated. It is one of the 
hand maidens of. the policy and program. Public informa-
tion is just one of the tools through which one can 
develop and maintain good public relations. Public re-
lations and public informationare ·nQt synonymous. 
To conclude, let it be said that public relations 
covers a broad field of which publicity and public information 
are important aspects. 
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CHAPTER III 
MILITARY PUBLIC RELATIONS 
Public relations has been defined. The next goal is 
to ascertain why the military forces of the United States 
need public relations. 
The armed services comprise America's biggest 
business. It may be compared to a great national corpora-
tion owned by 160 million stockholders who have invested 
billions of their dollars in equipping and operating this 
enterprise. 
Just as a corporation is accountable to its owners 
for the way their money is spent and their business is run, 
the armed forces must report fully and promptly on its 
affairs to the public. 
''Public relations provides the taxpayer with a 
balance sheet of his investment," says a former Navy Chief 
of Information. "The military do that through various 
programs which the taxpayer can evaluate and decide whether 
he's getting his money's worth."l 
Also, being a democracy, the government cannot cloak 
its operations in secrecy. Adequate information as to its 
activities must be given to its citizens or the foundation 
of its democracy will be eaten away. 
1Rear Admiral E. B. Taylor, USN, "The Increasing Im-
portance of Sea Power (Public Relations)M (paper read at the 
United States Naval Academy, Annapolis, Maryland, October 7, 
1957), p. 2. 
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Keeping the public informed of how his defense dollar 
is being spent, therefore, is a prime requirement of military 
public relations. But there is another responsibility. 
I. PAST HISTORY 
History has twice proved that failure to keep the 
American public and the members of the military establish-
ment properly informed, through an adequate public relations 
program concerning the hazards of one-sided disarmament, 
results in a breakdown of provisions ~for common defense." 
Pratt reports that:2 
After World War I and World War II, an uninformed 
public demanded that we demobilize. By yielding as we 
must in a democracy to popular demand, we opened the 
door to aggression, lost thousands of American lives, 
and unnecessarily prolonged hostilities with all its 
tragic consequences. 
Therefore, to prevent this occurring again, the 
armed services must maintain their ~defenses" in this field 
of public relations with the same skill that they devote to 
land, sea and air power. 
II. THE SCOPE OF MILITARY PUBLIC RELATIONS 
President Eisenhower said a few years ago:3 
We of the Army have been lagged in our awareness of 
public relations. This attitude perhaps dates from the 
2Laurence 0. Pratt, 11Recommendations for Defense 
Department Public Relations, 11 (unpublished report, 
Washington, D. C., 1955), p. 2. 
3 . Cited by Cutlip, ~· cit., p. 417. 
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era of the Indian Wars, when the Army was stationed in 
isolated outposts, and the military were a class unto 
themselves. I can still recall when I first heard the 
term "public relations officer." So far as I could see 
the job generally consisted of scaring up a couple of 
photographers and perhaps inviting an editor to the 
post in the hope that he would write a nice story. 
Unfortunately, many senior military officers still 
think of public relations in this manner. They fail to 
realize that publicity is just a means to an end--and that 
the crux of the matter is whether or not the military has 
been conducting itself in a manner conducive to good public 
opinion. 
15 
Lockhart, in his report on the Army information warns 
that a military service is only as good publicly as it is in 
reality. He states:4 
If the Army is good, the story will be good--and 
public relations will be good. If the Army is bad, 
the story will be bad and the results bad. In the end, 
public opinion about the Army reflects what the Army 
itself is. 
This truth is difficult for some Army personnel to 
realize and accept. They want the Army to be an ideal 
Army, a perfect Army, in the public mind, no matter 
what it may be in actualitye 
In other words, regardless of the caliber of the public 
relations program, the end result can be no better than the 
product itself. 
To help improve that product, is another responsibility 
of military public relations. The military public relations 
4Jack H. Lockhart, "The Lockhart Report" (War Depart-
ment, 1946, Reprinted by the Army Information School, Fort 
Slocum, New York, 1955), p. 2 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
16 
officer must constantly tell his commander the 
influence contemplated actions will have on public opinion. 
III. DEFINING MILITARY PUBLIC RELATIONS 
Admiral Robert B. Carney, USN, when he was Chief of 
5 Naval Operations, defined military public relations as: 
Military .public relations is the business of main-
taining mutually satisfactory understanding between 
the military and civilian community. It transcends 
the simple mechanics of telling the people about land, 
air and sea power. It is a reciprocal process involving 
every aspect of human conduct in the field of human re-
lations. It involves community relations. It involves 
internal understandings. 
Certainly before anything external can be accomplished, 
military people must know and understand their own par-
ticular service. 
The men and women in uniform are conspicuous indiv-
iduals because they, like the weapons they operate, 
represent a public trust. 
No public action of the individual, nothing he writes 
or says to the public, goes unnoticed. And, I might 
add, that sometimes the line between private relations 
and public relations is a thin one indeed, and it is a 
line that is constantly changing. 
Something that might appear to have only private 
significance today might eventually be of public interest, 
and, of course, the foundation of military public rela-
tions is public welfare. 
This, then, is the reason for public relations in the 
military. The people of the United States are requested to 
support a large and expensive military establishment. The 
5Admiral Robert B. Carney, USN, Chief of Naval Operations, 
11 Military Public Relations" (paper read before the Public 
Relations Society of America, New York, New York, May 5 1 1954), 
p. 3. 
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armed forces are making a heavy drain on the nation's wealth, 
manpower and natural resources. It is mandatory, therefore, 
that the armed forces create public understanding of their 
mission. No organization faces a stiffer public relations 
assignment. 
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CHAPTER IV 
HISTORY OF NAVAL INFORMATION 
''To know nothing of the past, 11 said an ancient 
philos,her, '1is to understand little of the present and to 
have no conception of the future. 111 
It was fel~, therefore, that a resume of naval 
I 
information history should be included in this study. 
Unlike naval operations, however, informational programs 
have not been detailed for posterity by the historians. 
But it has been possible to trace their development through-
out the years. 
I. THE REVOLUTION 
Although the concept of public information in the 
armed forces today is comparatively new, the practice of it 
has been with the services since the Revolution. Leading 
the troops was a man who was very sensitive to public 
opinion--George Washington. 
An example of the problems facing General Washington 
occurred in Norfolk in 1778. The French Admiral D'Estane 
had a fleet in the harbor with four thousand Marines 
aboard. The strategy of the day called for the fleet to 
put to sea. The Colonists, thinking the French were fleeing, 
1John Hammerton (ed. ), The New Illustrated World 
History, (New York: Wm. H. Wis~ rro;, Inc. 1947), p. v. 
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called them cowards. So, Washington had his committee on 
correspondence get out the word by letter and by mouth that 
the withdrawal was a military necessity, thus redeeming the 
French in the eyes of the Colonists.2 
Washington was fortunate to have a. man working for 
him whom is referred to as the first professional public 
information officer (PIO). With a. powerful pen, Thomas 
Paine served General Washington at every critical ~urn of 
events. 
II • THE EARLY YEARS 
In the earliest days of the Republic, the Navy was 
small, weak and generally neglected. On several occasions 
19 
disaster was narrowly averted because Americans as a. group 
were even more ignorant of the importance of sea power than 
they are toda.y. 3 
III. THE WAR WITH MEXICO 
The War with Mexico, from 1846 to 1848, brought the 
first glimmerings of the future relationship between the 
armed services and the public through the press. In this war 
for the first time correspondents accompanied the troops and 
frequently participated in battles. 
Public 
2Army Information School History of Armed Forces 
Information, A lecture (Fort Slocum; New York, 1954). 
3 Ib1d. 
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But there is no evidence that correspondents were 
embarked in naval vessels off Vera Cruz or California. 
IV. THE CIVIL WAR 
The Civil War saw the complete flowering of war 
correspondents and the adoption of these professional men 
as fixtures in all the staffs of large newspapers.4 
The Navy fared better than the Army~-where many a 
general thought of a correspondent as a spy. Admirals 
20 
Foote and Farragut regularly carried correspondents on their 
flagships during the Mississippi and New Orleans campaigns. 
The battle between the Merrimac (renamed Virginia) 
and the Monitor in Hampton Roads was interrupted because 
the press boat was in the line of fire of the two vessels. 
Another incident concerned ap illustrator for : Harper'. s 
Weekly who shouted a warning from a vantage point in the 
rigging of the Federal warship 11Mississippi, 11 thus averting 
a collision with the Confederate ram 11 Manassas." The second 
in command who received the warning was, himself, to make 
many a future headline. He was Lieutenant George Dewey, USN. 5 
V. THE SPANISH-AMERICAN WAR 
During this war the correspondents again freely roamed 
the battlefront, giving advice and occasionally taking part in 
battles. 
4Ibid. 
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There was no method or system for accrediting war 
correspondents, although the Navy Department made the first 
move in that direction by issuing passes allowing reporters 
to go aboard certain vessels during operations in the 
Caribbean. 
The journalistic romanticism of the day was further 
exploited by the many famous phrases and incidents that 
obtained wide-publicity--almost all involving the Navy. 
And, once again, the Navy--just as during the Civil War--
came out much better in its relations with the press than 
did the Army. 6 
For example, Admiral Dewey allowed and encouraged 
full coverage of action at Manila. So it is not surprising 
that there was a reporter on hand on the morning of March 
17, 1898, to report his famous order to the captain of the 
"Olympia 11 : 16 You may fire when ready, Gridley." 
VI. 1900- 1916 
Public interest in the services again waned between 
ware as it had throughout history. But, while the Army was 
discouraging reporters from having interviews with military 
leaders, the Navy was thinking about the problem.? 
The Secretary of the Navy suggested an information 
office to deal with the press and with book and magazine 
7 Ibid. 
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publishers. Unfortunately, this suggestion was made while 
President Taft's special committee was studying ways of 
effecting economies, so nothing was done about the Navy's 
plan. 
22 
The War Department, incidentally, appointed the first 
press release officer in 1916. The man who headed this 
offic e was Major Douglas MacArthur. 
VII. WORLD WAR I 
At the outbreak of World War I, there was a natural 
clamor for censorship. To satisfy this demand, President 
Wilson appointed a newspaperman of repute and of great 
organizing ability and imagination to head a committee of 
public information-- a man named George Creel. The Creel 
committee coordinated all government information and revo-
lutionized the entire philosophy of government informational 
services. Here, for the first time, was found the government 
taking responsibility for informing the press.a 
Secretary of the Navy Josephus Daniels began holding 
two press conferences a day in his office. And, soon after 
the Uni t ed States entered the war, the Secretary established 
the Navy News Bureau~-eimilar to the War Department Press 
Section-- which was directed by the 8ecretary. 9 Today, the 
Secretary is still charged with the responsibility for 
8Ibid. 
9uo s. ~Public Information Manual, op. cit., p. 
155. 
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directing Navy public relations. 
The World War I Navy News Bureau was headed by a 
newspaper man, John Jenkins. Although a start, it was in-
adequate. According to Rear Admiral Thomas H. Binford, 
USN: 10 
Jenkins and his staff did a fine job, but they 
were too few and too concentrated to be able to more 
than scratch the surface of the ignorance that 
separated the Navy from its supporters. 
This war saw the most orderly issuance of news 
releases and control of correspondents in the field thus far 
obtained. 
VIII. 1921 TO WORLD WAR II 
The need for good public relations continued to be 
recognized by the Navy following World War I. In 1922, a 
Public Relations unit was established as a branch of the 
Office of Naval Intelligence. 11 However, due to economy 
measures the funds were drastically cut and the Navy News 
Bureau seriously curtailed. Finally, a naval reserve 
officer took over the News Bureau, but was required to run 
it during his off-duty hours on his own time. 
In the Army, a minute information bureau also con-
tinued operations under the intelligence staff. 
There were isolated cases of progress in military 
information, however. In 1927, a young naval officer named 
1~ear Admiral Thomas H. Binford, Q2• cit., p. 23 
11Ib1.d., p. 2 
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Robert B. Carney- -later to become Chief of Naval Operations--
arranged f or n ews from the fleet to be sent by wireless for 
t h e fir st t ime duri ng battle maneuvera. 12 
In t he late thirties, the importance of the small 
Na vy News Br a nch i n Washington became apparent. And, in 
1939, it was r enamed the Public Relations branch of the 
Off ice of Naval I ntelligenc e and offices were established 
in a l l t he naval di stri cts.13 
Unlike the s low moving Army and Navy, the brash 
y oungster of t he Armed Forc es, the Air Corps, less bound 
by t r adit ion, moved rapi dly to capitalize on the glamour and 
color of their new weapon of war. The trail blazing com-
menc ed a s f ar back a s 1935 when Hap Arnold--to become the 
Ai r Force ' s first Chief of Staff--was chief of the informa-
tion divi si on of f ice of the Chief of Air Services, in the 
War Depart men t. l 4 
I X. WORLD WAR II 
In 1940, the Navy--along with the Army--perceived a 
need for expansi on of public relations programs. The repres-
sive hands of the i ntel l i gence staffs were removed. 15 
12statement by ADM Rober t B. Carney, USN, April 1953, 
pers ona l intervi ew. 
13u. S. Publ i c I nformat ion Manual , Q2o cit ., p. 155 
\ 
14 Cut lip,~· cit ., p. 25 
15~ s. Publ ic I nformation Manual, 22• cit., p. 156. 
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At the same time, the Chief of Naval Operations 
declared public relations to be a function of command. 16 
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World War II proved to be the best reported war and 
the period of best relations to date between the services 
and the press. There was a rapidity of communications with-
out parallel. News was transmitted by wire, radio, radio-
photo and on film. Many a sailor learned of the progress 
of the war--even in his own area--by monitoring night news 
t ransmissions. 
Travel by air also was greatly accelerated. Hundreds 
of correspondents flocked overseas to the various areas of 
conflict and the services accepted the full responsibility 
of caring for them.l7 
In the Navy, there was the opportunity to bring home 
forcibly to the public the meaning and importance of sea 
power. Navy public relations activities were expanded to 
seek this opportunity. On the whole, however, the oppor-
tunity was lost because of the lack of long-range_ planning.l8 
In 1944, the Navy public relations structure was 
reorganized for increased efficiency, and early in 1945, 
the first signs of a carefully thought-out national program 
appeared. The plan was designed to achieve both long-range 
and intermediate objectives. 
16Ibid. 
17Army Information School, ~· cit. 
1~. s. Navy Public Information Manual, op. cit., p. 
156. 
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X. POST WAR INFORMATION 
In an effort to eliminate feuding and to effect 
unification, an Office of Public Information was created 
for the National Military Establishment. 
James Forrestal, a former Secretary of the Navy 
a nd the first Secretary of Defense, established the Office 
of Public Information, Department of Defense, in March 
1949, as: 
the sole agency for the National Military 
· Establishment at the seat of the government for 
the dissemination of information to media of 
public information, to civil organizations, 
veterans organizations and other civilian public 
bodies, with the exceptions of the Congress of 
the United States.l9 
Perhaps the singlemost change since that time was 
26 
the appreciation of public relations throughout the service--
although today it is still objectionable to many. In 1950, 
the Secretary of the Navy directed that a provision be 
included in the fitness reports of all officers covering 
their ability to deal with the public. This was considered 
one of the most important steps in the history of naval 
public relations. 20 The provision affords the means of re-
minding all officers of their public relations responsibil-
ities. 
19cutlip, Q2· cit., p. 27 
20[. S. Navy Public Information Manual, loc. cit. 
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Having traced the development of Navy information, an 
examination of the present mission and organization of Navy 
information is next in order. 
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CHAPTER V 
NEW NUCLEAR NAVY 
Navy public relations and public information have 
but one purpose--to faithfully portray the United States 
Navy to those either in or out of uniform. In order to 
fulfill that responsibility, it is necessary to know the 
subject--the Navy--and its mission. 
I. PRIMARY MISSION OF THE NAVY 
The United States Navy exists for two fundamental 
purposes. First, the Navy's task is to support the 
foreign policy of the United States in widely sepa-
rated areas of the world ••• Second, the Navy's role in 
war is to control and use the seas for our own pur-
poses and to deny their use to the enemy.l 
The specific wartime functions of the Navy were 
spelled out in detail in a 1948 agreement called nThe 
Functions of the Armed Forces and the Joint Chiefs of 
Staff, 11 or better known as the "Key West Agreement.'' 
The Navy's primary mission, as expressed in this 
document, can be summed up as follows: 2 
1The Department of the Navy and Its Secretary, a 
report on basic facts pertaining to the Navy (Washington: 
Department of the Navy, 1956) pp. I-1 to I-6. 
2The United States Navy, A pamphlet prepared by the 
Office of Armed Forces Information & Education, DOD Pam 1-8, 
DA Pam 21-89, NAVPERS 92418, AFP 190-1-8, NAVMO 1134 (Wash-
ington: Government Printing Office, 1957), p. 8. 
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To seek out and destroy enemy naval forces and to 
suppress enemy sea commerce. 
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To control vital sea areas and to protect vital sea 
lines of communication. 
To seize and defend advanced naval bases. 
To conduct air operations as necessary for the 
accomplishment of objectives in a naval campaign. 
To provide naval (including naval air) forces ae 
required for the defense of the United States against 
air attack. 
In other words, the mission of the Navy is: Control 
of the ~--maintaining control of the sea as a ready force 
on watch at home and overseas, capable of strong action to 
preserve the peace or of instant offensive action to win in 
war.J 
II. CONTROL OF THE SEAS 
The need for a powerful Navy to control the seas has 
not been made obsolete by the atomic bomber. In fact, as a 
former Chief of Naval Operations, Admiral Robert B. Carney, 
stated it: 4 
In the atomic age--in the age of the so-called 
"push-button war 10--the need for control of the seas 
is more imperative than ever. We could not fight a 
11push-button 11 war for long without the ability to 
transport from points over the world the more than 50 
rare and critical items, ranging from agar and antimony 
to vanadium and zinc, needed to make our weapons. 
The American fleet is the lifeline of the free world ••• 
3office of the Chief of Naval Operations, Carriers Are 
Vital to the Atomic Navy (Washington: Bureau of Ships, 195~ 
Po 18. 
~obert B. Carney, 11A tomic Viet ory Depends on the Navy, '1 
Nations Business Magazine (February, 1954) 
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It is apparent that the struggle · in southeast Asia would 
be hopeless were the free world denied the use of the 
seas. 
This view was reiterated by the present Chief of Naval 
Operati ons, Admiral Arleigh Burke: 5 
The importance of the Navy is increasing as we move 
ahead into the nuclear-missile age. The importance of 
control of the seas is increasing. Most of our friends 
and allies are located across the seas. The Free World 
is actually an oceanic confederation (which) depends 
for its existence upon the sea communications which 
bind it together. 
The basic role of the Navy, to protect and defend 
America by control of the seas, is essentially the same as 
it was 150 years ago. However, naval influence has grown 
enormously, and the weapon systems necessary to exert the 
influence have expanded accordingly. And they will continue 
to expand. 
More submarines and fewer aircraft will make up the 
Navy of the future. The future fleet will include about 
150 ships with nuclear power, surface-to-air missiles in 
about 200 ships, and anti-submarine aircraft aboard nearly 
all combatant ships.6 
Control of the seas is indispensable for the prevention 
of all-out nuclear war, and if need be, for the long climb to 
victory after a nuclear attack. 
To maintain control of the seas, the Navy's battle-
ground has always been the oceans which cover three-
quarters of the earth's surface. However, today, modern 
5 The United States Navy, £2• cit., p. 8, citing Admiral 
Arleigh Burke. 
6 . 
"New Navy Will Have More Submarines, Fewer Planes, 
Increased ASW Gear," Army Navy Air Force Journal, Vol. 95 
(February 15, 1958), p. 6 
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weapons like the jet airplane and the guided missile extend 
the Navy's radius of action far inland from the old limit 
of the high-water ma.rk of an enemy coast. 7 
A new weapons system, for example, involves the 
Polaris--a guided missile. 
The new idea, as radical as the development of the 
atom bomb, combines two new Navy weapons: the swift, 
deep-swimming nuclear submarine, and the intermediate-
range, shipboard type ballistic missile, Polaris. 
Such a mating would permit the far-ranging nuclear 
subs, lying submerged offshore at vital points around 
the Eurasian land mass to launch thermonuclear missiles 
at any target within 1500 miles of their position, and 
be all but immune to counterattack. 
With a minimum of ten subs on station, the U. B. 
Navy would be sitting within striking distance of 95% 
of the more populated Communist cities and 90% of the 
Soviet industrial empire.8 
But primarily, the Navy is a deterrent to war--as 
are all U. s. armed forces. 
The Navy discourages aggression. The Navy has a 
unique capability not possessed by any other force or 
service and that is the ability to apply diplomatic 
pressure with the nicest degree of control in the 
waters of a potsnti*l enemy without committing the 
country to war. 
To conclude, it would be well to list the following 
points: 
The new Navy, is pre-eminently, a Navy of nuclear 
power. 
7New Weapons in the New Navy, A pamphlet (Philadel-
phia: General Electric Company, 1957), p. 5. 
8
•
1The New Weapons System," Time (March 3, 1958 ), 
pp. 14-15. 
9The Increasing Importance of the U. s. ~~ A 
pamphlet, (Washington: Office of Information, Department of 
the Navy, 1957) p. 48. 
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Fixed bases in the U. S. and overseas can be 
geographically pinpointed long before an attack: so 
can ports and cities. But the Navy always keeps some 
ships at seao 
The new Navy has more jobs to do than any other 
serviceo 
32 
Since World War II and Japan's defeat by American 
seapower, modern Russia has demonstrated a new awareness 
of t he importance of the sea, just as did the Germany of 
the Kaiser more than half a century ago after Alfred 
T;h!l--\.jler Mahan had written his epic 11 Influence of Sea 
Power Upon History." 
The U. S. Navy is the first of the services to have 
every functional type of missile there is in operation 
and production. 
The new Navy, now has an ancillary continental air 
defense role, as well as an ancillary strategic bombing 
role. 
The direct influence of seapower upon landpower now 
extends thousands of miles beyond the high-water mark 
and the range of a rifled gun.lO 
III. THE ROLE OF PUBLIC OPINION 
Public relations and public information have a vital 
role in connection with this New Nuclear Navy. For, as one 
sourcell states it: 
It is every American's responsibility to keep 
informed of what his Navy stands for. 
To know why we need seapower in global dimensions, 
why i t must cost us so much in taxes, what we buy with 
that money, is the surest way to provide the enlightened 
support which the Navy must have. 
10The New Nav,, A pamphlet (Annapolis: United States 
Naval Institute, 195 ), p. 341 citing Hanson Baldwin, "Is The Navy Obsolete, 10 The Saturday Evening Post, · (August 11, 1956). 
11Ib1do 1 P• 43o 
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Public relations and public information fills the 
role of enlightening public opinion on the Navy. This is 
extremely important today--perhaps more so than ever before 
in the history of the country. As mentioned, tne United 
States let its armed forces decline in the past and the 
results were disastrous wars. 
Today, with the growing role of air power, the Navy 
finds itself being delegated to a minor role. It must, 
therefore, conduct a vigorous public relations program to 
keep the public informed of its role and mission. It is 
believed that when the public is informed, it will demand 
a powerful Navy. 
In the past the might of t'he Navy has been self-
evident. The long grey line of battleships, then the air-
craft carriers, dramatized the Fleet. But today it is hard 
to portray the power a Polaris submarine has, or the terror 
an enemy missile-submarine holds for an American city. 
Thus, to repea~the mission of Navy public information 
and public relations is: to enlighten the public on the role 
of the Navy. 
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CHAPTER VI 
NAVY PUBLIC INFORMATION MISSION AND ORGANIZATION 
One of the objectives of this study was to ascertain 
whether or not the public information mission of the Navy was 
consistent with the overall mission of the Navy. This 
chapter, therefore, outlines the present mission and the 
organization in existence to carry out that mission. 
I. NAVY PUBLIC INFORMATION MISSION 
The current Navy public information mission is simply 
stated: 1 
The information mission of the Navy is to inform the 
public and the naval service concerning: 
(a) the Navy as an instrument of national policy 
and security, and 
(b) the activities of the Navy, as compatible with 
military security, and 
(o) the responsibilities and participation of 
naval personnel as United States citizens under the 
American concept of government and society. 
As may be seen in Appendix A, the Marine Corps also 
has a short, concise information mission. However, the 
Army and Air Force have detailed missions which also spell 
out their public information ''objectives.'' 
The Navy makes a differentiation between 11 mission 11 
and "objectives." The latter are subject to revision in 
1u. S. Navy Public Information Manual,_Q2. cit., p. 3 
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keeping with the times, while the mission is permanent. 
II. INFORMATION OBJECTIVES OF THE NAVY 
In furtherance of the Navy's functional missions and 
in discharging the Navy's obligation to inform the public and 
naval service, the current paramount information objectives 
are: 2 
(a) Understanding of the continuing importance of 
seapower. 
(b) Understanding of the Navy's role today. 
(c) Understanding of the Navy's future role. 
(d) Encouragement for career service. 
(e) A vigorous Naval Reserve. 
(f) Public awareness of the need for a modernized 
fleet. 
(g) Public awareness of growing Soviet naval strength. 
III. DISCUSSION 
It is interesting to note that only the Army makes a 
distinction between '0public information" and ''public rela-
tions.~ This is a continuance of the misunderstanding of 
public relations in some quarters of military and civilian 
organizations. 
2Ibid. 
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For example, a lecture at the Army Information 
School states: 
••• since 1949 there have been few changes of 
major importance (in the public information field)3 
other than the redesignation b~ all services of the 
programs from ~public relations" to "public informa-
tion.~ This change in nomenclature does not mirror 
a change in concept or policy, but is merely a bow to 
semanticso4 
It is true that there was no change in concept, but 
it is not true that it was "merely a bow to semantics." 
For, as it was pointed out in Chapter III, public relations 
and public information cannot be interchanged. 
One cannot help noticing that in neither the public 
information mission nor the public information objectives are 
the terms "nuclear power" and "missiles" mentioned. Yet 
those two items are today the Navy 1 s foremost public 
attraction. 
Nor is there any mention of the Navy's contribution 
to peacetime science--the Antarctic expeditions, the Nav~l 
Observatory's work, naval medical research, to name a few. 
IV. NAVAL INFORMATION ORGANIZATION 
Three individuals bear the entire responsibility 
for Navy information and public relations. According to 
the U. S. Navy Public Information Manua1: 5 
3Insert in parenthesis those of the author. 
4Army Information School, £2• cit. 
5~. S. Navy Public Information Manual, ~· cit., p. 7 
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Secretary of the Navy 
The Secretary of the Navy maintains under his 
immediate supervision and direction those activities 
of the Navy Department which involve vital relation-
ships with the public. 
Chief of Naval Operations 
The Chief of Naval Operations will assure the 
effective implementation of the public information 
policies of the Secretary of the Navy within all 
units of the operating forces, Naval Air Training 
Command, and the bureaus, boards and offices. 
Chief of Information 
The Chief of Information is designated as the 
direct representative of the Secretary of the Navy 
and of the Chief of Naval Operations in all matters 
of public information. As such, he shall be con-
sulted concerning the public information aspects of 
proposed naval plans and policies. 
3? 
The Chief of Information heads the public informa-
tion and public relations organization of the Navy which is 
world-wide. Besides advising the Chief of Naval Operations 
and the Secretary on public relations matters, he also ad-
vises and gives guidance to the naval district commandants, 
the fleet commanders, type commanders such as Commander, 
Submarine Force, tJ. s. Atlantic Fleet, the naval air commands, 
and the numerous miscellaneous naval activities under the 
Department of the Navy. 
Full-time public information officers are on duty 
in the naval districts, at fleet and type commands, naval 
training c·ent ere 1 the bureaus of the Navy Department, plus 
miscellaneous commands such as Commander Naval Forces 
Marianas •. Public information officers titled "command 
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liaison officers 1 are on duty at all the naval air stations. 
And, finally, each naval activity without a full-time public 
information officer, and each ship of the Navy, has a 
collateral duty public information officer. 
Office of Information 
To coordinate the public information and public 
relations program of the Navy, there has been established an 
Office of Information within the organization of the Executive 
Office of the Secretary of the Navy and under the direction of 
the Chief of Information. 
The Office of Information is composed of three 
operation divisions--Public Information, Civil Relations, and 
Internal Relations--and a Planning Division and an Adminis-
trative Division. Appendix B details the specific responsi-
bilities of each of these divisions. 
In general, it can be stated that the Administrative 
Division handles correspondence, personnel and budget matters; 
the Public Information Division is the publicity branch--
press, photography, radio-television and magazine and book; 
the Civil Relations Division handles guest cruises, liaison 
with national organizations, speakers and special events; 
the Internal Relations Division is responsible for the Fleet 
Home Town News Program, liaison with naval activities on 
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public relations matters, and the Naval Reserve Public 
Relations program; and the Planning Division works on 
public relations projects and programs for future require-
ments. 
Discussion 
That, then, is the organization of the Navy 
information program. Under the Chief of Information--who 
is responsible to the Secretary of the Navy and to the 
39 
Chief of Naval Operations--the Office of Information coordi-
nates the public relations activities of the naval districts, 
fleets, air commands and other naval activities of the 
Department of the Navy. 
It was to these commands, offices and public 
information activities that the civilian recommendations 
were directed. 
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CHAPTER VII 
THE CIVILIAN STUDIES 
Five distinct reports were examined in this thesis. 
However, one is the consolidation of three studies by John 
B. Shipman. 
Shipman has been engaged in public relations in 
Washington, D. C., for nearly ten years. In 1952, in con-
junction with Commander (now Captain) James C. Shaw, USN, of 
the Navy Office of Information, Shipman did a study of Navy 
public relations. The report was entitled MThe Case for 
Navy Public Information.Ml 
A year later, Shipman did another study for the 
Navy Chief of Information. This evaluation was confined to 
four areas: the Navy Reserve public information program; 
the selection and training of naval personnel for public 
information duties; Navy community relations; and the Navy's 
internal relations program. 
In late 1954, Shipman again was called upon to re-
evaluate the Navy 1 s public relations program.2 This evalua-
tion was the first report studied in this research. 
The second report examined was the oldest. It was 
1James C. Shaw & John B. Shipman, The Case For Navy 
Public Information (Washington: Office or-!nformation, 
Department of the Navy, 1952) 
2John B. Shipman, MEvaluation Study Concerning Navy 
Public InformationM (unpublished report, O!f~ce of Information, 
Department of the Navy, Washington, D. C., 1954). 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
41 
prepared by Jack H. Lockhart. 3 On May 1, 1946, Lieutenant 
General J. Lawton Collins, Director of Army Information and 
later to become Army Chief of Staff, and Major General Floyd 
L. Parks, Director of the Army 1s Bureau of Public Relations, 
made arrangements through Roy W. Howard and John Sorrells, 
of the Scripps-Howard Newspapers, for Lockhart's services. 
The Lockhart report is still in use by the Army and is a 
text for one of their training courses at the Army Informa-
t ion School. 
A third report dealt with security and classification 
of material prepared by a committee headed by the Honorable 
Charles A. Coolidge. 4 Coolidge had headed many special gov-
ernment committees and had served as Assistant Secretary of 
Defense for Legal and Legislative Affairs. 
The last two reports were compiled by Laurence 0. 
Pratt. At the time of the studies, Pratt had just left 
from the advertising and public relations firm of Batten, 
Barton, Durstine and Osborn to open his own consulting firm. 
His brother, Albert, at the time was Assistant Secretary of 
the Navy for Personnel. 
In 1955, Laurence Pratt did a study of the entire 
3Lockhart, ..2E• cit. 
4charles A. Coolidge (chairman), Report to the Sec-
retary of Defense £z the Committee on Classified Information 
(Washington: Department of Defense,-r956) 
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naval public relations program, 5 followed by one on the 
Office of Public Information, Department of Defense. 6 
In the next chapter these reports will be examined 
and discussed with two thoughts in mind: first, in what 
areas do they overlap--in other words, do the reviewing 
experts all report that certain sensitive areas in the in-
formation programs were lacking or deficient; and, second, 
could these recommendations be undertaken by the naval in-
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formation and public relations program, or are there extenu-
ating circumstances which prevent their adoption. 
Although two of these reports were not made for the 
Navy, they will be related, insofar as possible, to the 
naval information and public relations program. Lockhart, 
for example, wrote only about the Army. Therefore, in his 
actual report a recommendation reads: "The Army band should 
tour principal cities ••• M But, since this is a study relating 
these recommendations to the Navy, this recommendation will 
be altered to read: "The Navy band should tour principal 
cities ••• 10 
A similar formula will be applied to the Defense 
study compiled by Pratt, and Coolidge's security report. 
The other studies of Pratt and Shipman were made on 
the Navy, so no modification of the recommendations are 
necessary. 
5Laurence o. Pratt, ''Report on Navy Information" 
(unpublished, Office of Information, Navy Department, 
Washington, D. c., 1955) 
6pratt, Defense Report, £2• cit. 
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CHAPTER VIII 
THE RECOMMENDATIONS 
Before studying the recommendations and their value, 
the question of whether or not the reports overlapped was 
investigatedo 
The recommendations broke down into seven major 
categoriesg (1) public relations, (2) administration, 
( 3) public information, (4) civil relations, (5) internal 
relations~ (6} plans and inspections, and (7) security. 
Before progressing further, definitions should be 
given listing what each of the foregoing areas include: 
Public relations: general policies dealing with the 
public relations of the Navy. 
Administration: organization for naval information, 
personnel 9 training of public information personnel, and 
funds for the program. 
Public Information: press relations, press releases, 
press queries, photography, radio-television, magazines 
and books 9 interviews, and a miscellaneous category in-
cluding such programs as public information for the 
International Security Affairs organization. 
Civil Relations: disseminating information on civil 
relations 9 speakers programs, bands, parades, holidays, 
open houses~ athletics, Joint Civilian Orientation 
Conference 9 exhibits, national organizations, in the 
field 9 and organization. 
Internal Relations: public information manual, fleet 
home town news program, internal information, recruiting 
and reenlistment, internal policy, and naval reserve 
public relatLons. 
Plans and Inspections: departmental policy, inspections, 
objectives, research, planning, and war planning. 
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Security: security review, classification, over-
classification, ·declassification, cold war, interviews, 
congressional, industry, and leaks. 
I • AREAS COVERED 
The following table shows how the reports dealt with 
the above listed areas: 
TABLE I 
NUMBER OF RECOMMENDATIONS OF CIVILIAN STUDIES 
AREA Shipman Pratt Pratt Coolidge Lockhart Total 
Nav;y:: DOD 
Public Relations 1 2 ~ 
Administration 26 15 2 ? 50 
Public Information 2 5 6 24 ~? 
Civil Relations 1~ 1 ? 10 a1 
Internal Relations 25 ? 2 1 a5 
Plans-InsEections l 7 3 4 15 
Securit;y:: l ~ 28 32 
Based upon the general categories, the following table 
outlines how the reports dealt with each specific area. As 
mentioned before, the Shipman report is a consolidation of 
three different studies which are being treated as one 
report. 
I 
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TABLE 2 
I SPECIFIC AREAS COVERED BY THE CIVILIAN STUDIES 
AREA Shipman Pratt Pratt Coolidge Lockhart 
I Nav;l DOD PUBLIC RELATIONS l 2 
ADMINISTRATION 
I Organization 4 l 3 Personnel 18 4 2 
·Training 8 5 2 
I Funds 2 l PUBLIC INFORMATION 
Press l 3 8 
I Queries l 2 9 Photography l l 
Radio-Television l 
I Magazine-Books l l Interviews l 
Miscellaneous l l 5 
I CIVIL RELATIONS Dissem. Info. 2 
Personnel 2 l 
I Speakers l 3 Band l 
Parades l 
I Holidays l Open Houses 2 Athletics l 
I JCOC l Exhibits l Nat 1 l Org. l 
I Directives l Field Org. 8 l Ors;anization 
I INTERNAL RELATIONS Manual l Home Town News l 
I Internal Info 5 l 2 Reenlistment 3 Internal Policy 2 l 
I Naval Reserve 17 l Personnel l 
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AREA Shipman Pratt Pratt Coolidge Lockhart 
Navy DOD 
PLANS-INSPECTIONS 
War Planning 1 
Department Plans 1 1 
Inspection 1 2 
Objectives 3 
Research 1 1 
Planning 2 2 
SECURITY 
Security Review 1 3 
Classification 8 
Over-classification 2 
Declassification 1 
Military Policy 1 
Cold War 1 
Interviews 1 
Congressional 1 
Industry 1 
Leaks 9 
Administration 3 
An examination of the table showed that while the 
recommendations were fairly evenly distributed over the 
larger categories, they were thinly spread within each 
grouping. 
The largest subject covered was the administration 
of personnel, with 18 recommendations. A close second was 
the Naval Reserve public relations program, with 17. 
Also high in the administrative category was the 
training of personnel with 15 recommendations. The highest 
subject in Public Information was press with 12; in Civil 
Relations, field organization and administration, 9; in 
Plans and Inspections, planning with 4; and in Security, 
leaks with 9 recommendations. 
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With this wide scope of recommendations, the conclusion 
has been drawn that Q£ Qg! !£!! is considered ~ important 
or ~ deficient--but that most areas of navy public informa-
tion and public relations can stand alterations. 
II. PUBLIC RELATIONS 
It was surprising to learn that but three out of more 
than two hundred recommendations dealt with the specific 
area of ~public relations.M Of course, it is conceded that 
certain aspects of civil relations and internal relations 
also fall into the general area of public relations. 
It also was revealing to learn that but two recommenda-
tiona actually had to do with public opinion--the real founda-
tion of public relations. 
Recommendations 
1- Mobilize the best brains and experience in the 
country to discuss and recommend policies for the 
fullest utilization of American know-how in the field 
of public relations--in the interests of national 
security.l 
2- The public in the long run will judge the Navy 
not by what it says but by what it does. Incidents 
have more impact than words. The Navy must do all 
it can, as a public relations job, if for no other 
reason, to prevent unfavorable incidents happening.2 
1Pratt, Defense Report, ~· £11., rec. 1 
~ookhart, 22· cit., Part II, para. 46. 
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3- Public relations must be cultivated and pruned. 
You can't furlough your public relations or demobilize 
them until you need them- or they won't be there when 
you need them.3 
Discussion 
1~ It has long been a governmental procedure to call 
into service high ranking civilian technicians to solve 
intricate problems facing the nation. The problem of 
missiles and space recently came to the Washington fore-
f ront--and a president of a large university was immediately 
summoned by the President.4 A look at the comparable status 
of the United States versus the Soviet Union was desired--
and the President appointed a committee headed by Gaither. 
What is recommended by Pratt for public relations, is that 
the same theory be applied--that the top public relations 
professionals of the United States be called to Washington 
to share their ~know-howM with the military in an advisory 
capacity. 
2- If the Navy is good, the story told to the public 
will be good. If the Navy is bad, the story will have to be 
bad. In other words, public opinion of the Navy reflects 
what the Navy itself 1e. For that reason, the Navy must 
constantly strive to prevent unfavorable incidents from 
happening. And, if they are inevitable, full public 
3Ibid., Part I, para. 23 
4James R. Killian, President of Massachusetts 
Institute of Technology. 
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annouoement should be made--before the act "leaks" out. They 
should be acknowledged and cleaned up promptly. 
3- Public relations cannot lay dormant until there is 
a "tire 11--wai ting until unfavorable public opinion flares up 
in protest before employing sound public relations measures. 
Instead, public relations must be constantly active in working 
toward removing the causes of public opinion. 5 When dormant 
public relations are called upon, often they will be found to 
have disappeared and one has to start from scratch. And, as 
Lockhart puts it, "that causes a lot of soratohing. 116 
III. ADMINISTRATION 
A total of 50 recommendations, or about one-fourth of 
the total, were concentrated in the administration area of 
naval information. The specific subjects covered were organ-
ization, personnel, training and funds. 
Organization 
Recommendations 
1- Make the Chief of Information a Vice Admiral. 7 
2- The Deputy Chief of Information should be a 
specialist (1650 or 1655) rear admiral.a 
3- The Chief and Deputy Chief of Information should 
be immediately re~ponsible to the Secretary and Chief of 
Naval Operations. 
5canfield, 2E• cit., p. 21 
~eckhart, loc. cit. 
7Pratt, Navy Report, ~· cit., Part I, reo. 4 
8Ibid. 1 reo. 3. 
9tockhart, QE• cit., Part I, para. 18. 
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4- The Chief of Information should be the PIO for 
every di vision, section and branch of the Navy 
Department ,10 
5- The PIO in the field should have more responsi-
bility in internal and civil relations.ll 
6- In the naval districts and fleets, officers with 
the rank of captain should be appointed as Assistant 
Chiefs of Staff under whom the functions of Public 
Relations, Internal Relations and Civil Relations would 
fall.12 
7- When the PIO or Journalist reports to a ship he 
should carry with him a set of specific duty assign-
ments from his Fleet Commander.l\5 
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8- Branch offices of the Office of Information should 
be established in New York and Los Angeles. They should 
not be a part of some other command.l4 
Discussion 
With the exception of the ~ast recommendation, all 
the others have relation, in part, to increasing the status 
of PIO personnel, clarifying their responsibilities, and 
the scope of their authority. 
Pratt's philosophy of having the Chief of Information 
a vice admiral, tied in with Lockhart's recommendation that 
he be immediately responsible to the Secretary and Chief of 
Naval Operations parallels industry. In pPactically every 
l arge company which depends for its existence on public 
10Ibid., Part II, para. 63. 
11Pratt, Navy Report, £2• cit., Part II, rec. 21 
12:tbid. 
13Ibid., Part II, rec. 10 
14Lockhart, 22• cit., Part II, para. 22. 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
51 
acceptance, the head of public relations is a vice president 
reporting directly to the President. This is a recognition 
of the fact that public relations cannot be effective unless 
it participates at the highest level in policy making decisions. 
There also are other reasons. First, such a move would 
increase the morale of the entire Navy public information pro-
gram. Its morale is constantly being punctured by unending 
investigations and by the spankings administered by the Con-
gress, the Department of Defense, and by the Navy itself. For 
example, the Congressional limitation on PI funds; the Defense 
harking that the Chinfo 1 s will be reduced in size; and by such 
Navy papers as the Low Report.l5 
Second, the increased status of the Chief of Informa-
tion would assist in securing the respect and cooperation ~f 
the senior flag officers of the Navy. They are the ones who 
make or break Navy public relations. In addition, it would 
make the billet one to be sought by outstanding rear admirals 
as a means to a third star.l6 In lieu of having the billet 
arbitrarily assigned, there would be competition for the 
position. 
Third, the increased status would not only assist the 
Chief of Information, himself, but would assist the lieutenant 
15A board headed by Vice Admiral Francis s. Low, USN, 
in 1953 recommended the abolishment of the PIO specialist in 
the Navy. The Secretary vetoed the plan. 
16Rear Admirals are "two star• officers, vice admirals 
"three star." 
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junior grade PIO in Subic Bay, the journalist in New Mexico, 
and the Commander in the Mediterranean. It would raise the 
prestige of the program, and in so doing would raise the 
prestige of each and every ~ember of the program. This 
would facilitate his accomplishing the assigned job. 
As recommended b~ Lockhart, the Navy's Chief of 
Information is directly responsible to the Secretary of the 
Navy and to the Chief of Naval Operations. It should remain 
so for the reasons outlined above. 
Pratt's recommendation that the Deputy Chief of 
Information be a Rear Admiral and a PIO specialist would 
accomplish two major objectives. One, it would give the 
PIO specialist more incentive. This, expanded, would in-
crease his morale; it would increase his productivity because 
he would be striving for the best possible performance to 
enhance his chance for promotion; and it would keep him in 
the service. Recent years have seen a constant flow of the 
best of Navy PIC's from the service to civilian organizations 
where opportunity for advancement--not to mention financial 
remunerations--are much greater. 
Raising the Deputy to the rank of rear admiral and 
having him a PIO specialist would also have organizational 
and efficiency connotations. It would mean that within the 
organization there were two flag officers, in lieu of the 
present one, thus giving more weight to the Office of 
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Information and to its dealings with other offices. 
From an efficiency point of view, it would mean that 
there was a Mprofessional" in the front office. An officer 
selected for the billet would have to be one with years of 
navy information experience--which would balance the lack of 
experience in the field of the Chief of Information. 
Pratt had two other recommendations: increased re-
sponsibility in the non-public information fields, namely, 
internal and civil relations; and, his advice to elevate the 
district and fleet PIO billets to the rank of captain. 
Every commander recognizes that for the smooth func-
tioning of his command, he must have the support of the 
community in which he operates. Yet, too often the command 
PIO is tied down with public information duties. To over-
come this deficiency, therefore, the PIO should be assigned 
more responsibility for community relations, making it manda-
tory that he spend more time in this field. 17 
In internal relations, the Navy has no planned and 
coordinated Navy-wide internal relations plan. This must 
first be established within the Office of Information, then 
expanded to the PIO in the field.l8 
If these recommendations were placed into effect, it 
17section V of this chapter deals with Civil Relations. 
18section VI of this chapter deals with Internal 
Relations. 
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would mean that the field PIO would be in charge of public 
information, civil relations and internal relations. He no 
longer would be a public information officer, but would 
become a public relations officer. 
54 
By making this public relations officer an assistant 
chief of staff with the rank of captain, he would be placed 
in the same relative stature as the Chief of Information 
bears to the Secretary and to the Chief of Naval Operations. 
Lockhart's last recommendation--that branch offices be 
established in New York and Los Angeles has been accomplished 
by the Navy. However, his advice to have them organizationally 
responsible only to the Office of Information is not the case. 
The branch offices are responsible to their appropriate naval 
district headquarters. This is in keeping with Navy policy 
that the Commandant of a naval district is responsible for 
all commands within his district. It has not been a policy 
which has interfered in any way with the performance of the 
branch offices since close communication is maintained with 
the Office of Information. 
Public Information Personnel 
Public information personnel in the Navy fall into five 
categories: (l) regular Navy PIO specialists; (2) reserve PIO 
specialists; (3) other officers filling full-time public 
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information assignments; (4) officers having collateral dutyl9 
assignments as PIO; and, (5) enlisted journalists. 
In order for the Navy's information program to 
operate effectively, a powerful personnel plan must be put 
into effect. As Pratt states:2° 
If the Navy wants good Public Relations, it must take 
steps to supply the trained and motivated people to do 
the job. 
Pratt develops the personnel picture further. He 
cites the following example:21 
A private company covers one state with a population 
of 2,000,000. Number of employees to be kept informed 
is 10,000. The number of people engaged in full time 
public relations work is 33. This is supplemented by 
the varied talents of an advertising agency, and help, 
guidance and support from the home office. 
Comparing this with the present set-up in a typical 
naval district we find: number of states to be covered, 
13; population, 38 1 000 1 000; Personnel in naval establish-
ment 30,000; full time Navy public relations people -- ?. 
Outside help, little or none. 
It is evident that the Navy's program for public 
information person~el is weak. This was highlighted by the 
civilian studies which made a total of 24 recommendations in 
this area. They fall into three categories: selection, 
fitness, and assignment. 
19At small shore activities and aboard ship it is 
impracticable to have a full-time PIO. An officer, whose 
primary duty may be navigator, is assigned additional duty 
as PIO. 
20pratt, Navy Report, £2• cit., p. 81 
2lrb1d., p. 80. 
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Recommendations for selection 
At the time of the Shipman report, there was no means 
for a qualified reserve PIO officer to transfer to the Regu-
lar Navy. As a reserve he faced the constant threat of being 
inactivated, and the Navy of losing a qualified officer. 
Shipman, therefore, spent some time on outlining a transfer 
or augmentation program. 22 This program was established by 
the Navy in 1955 and in the initial increment a total of 11 
reserve officers were transferred to the regular Navy as PIO 
specialists. This program is still active--although not to 
the same degree for two reasons: first, the number of vacan-
cies are not as plentiful; second, all interested applicants 
were screened in 1955 and the new group of candidates is, 
therefore, much smaller. 
Shipman had other recommendations in this area which 
have not been implemented, however. 
1- Screen first-classmen at the Naval Academy and 
NROTC seniors to determine public information inclina-
tions and aptitudes. Tag those showing such inclinations 
and aptitudes for future voluntary assignment to PIO 
duties.2~ 
2- The Bureau of Naval Personnel should screen all 
non- specialist officers being considered for public 
information duty to determine their inclinations and 
aptitude for such duty.24 
22shipman, op. cit., pp. 32-35. 
23Ibid., p. 45. 
24Ibid., p. 41 
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3- ~hat no officer be assigned to public information 
duty unless he so agree.25 
Lockhart adds one more recommendation in this immedi-
ate area: 
4- Persons assigned to public relations duty must have 
a genuine liking for and interest in the work, news 
people, and news mediums.26 · 
Discussion 
Selection of regular Navy PIO specialists as at 
present--namely, augmentation from the reserve and selection 
from regular Navy unrestricted line officers--should continue 
to guarantee a sufficient number of replacements. 
But, Shipman and Lockhart were talking about the non-
PIO specialist and the collateral duty PIO. Admiral Binford, 
speaking on selection of these officers, stated:27 
You must do more than fill the spot with a warm body. 
The PIO is an officer to whom you are entrusting your 
reputation, that of your command and the Navy. Con-
sequently, he should be an officer in whom you have 
confidence, you can respect, and, who is interested in 
and adaptable to the work. 
Shipman's recommendations were aimed at a long-range 
program-~testing midshipmen for future PIO duty--and the 
present time. His advice that only officers who are inclined 
for PIO duty, have the aptitude for it, and are interested in 
that type of duty, is further supported by Lockhart who stated 
25Ibid., pp. 41-42. 
26Lockhart, ~· £11., Part II, para. 2. 
27Binford, £2• cit. 
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that Mnews people are quick to detect the officer who is 
dealing with them at arm's length with mental scorn and 
only because he has been assigned to the job." 
In conclusion, the Navy should screen all non-
58 
specialist officers being considered for immediate or future 
assignment to PIO duties. 
Recommendations for Fitness 
Shipman recognized that in the PIO program, as in any 
organization or group, there are incompetents. In addition 
to contributing inefficient performances, they also give the 
entire specialty a ~bad" reputation. To that end he 
recommended that: 
1- The Chief of Information request selection boards28 
to consider selecting out officers with an unsatisfactory 
past performance.29 
Selection boards use fitness reports--reports made out 
by commanding officers on all officers in their commands con-
cerning their performance of duty--for promotion, and if the 
case arises, for selecting out of the service incompetent 
officerso 
One of the problems in the information program, 
however, has been with the criteria used by the commanding 
officers in marking the reports. Few of the commanding 
officers have a PIO background or are completely aware of the 
28selection boards are composed of nine senior officers 
and are convened annually to select qualified officers for 
promotiono 
29shipman, QE• cit., p. 31 
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job the PIO should be doing. To overcome this problem, 
Shipman recommended: 
2-That the Chief of Information forward, through 
the Chief of Naval Personnel, a firm criteria for the 
guidance of commanding officers in marking PIO fitness 
reports.30 
Discussion 
The latter recommendation would have two effects. 
59 
First, it would lead to a more intelligent grading of PIC's. 
Second, it would educate the commanding officer as to what 
to expect in his PIO program. 
There is one bad aspect of the selecting out program--
that is the problem of how to handle the officers being 
'
1fired 11 so they don't turn into a liability to the Navy. The 
handling of these officers would have to be done on an indi-
vidual basis--depending upon the officer and upon the degree 
of poor performance which caused the dismissal. 
Recommendations for Assignment 
Recommendations for the utilization of public informa-
tion personnel covered the specialist, the non-specialist full-
time PIO, and the enlisted journalist. 
The suggestions relating to the specialist included: 
30 Ibid., p. 30. 
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1- The Chief of Information urge all PI0 1 s to rotate 
junior PI0 1 s in their office throughout all PIO duties.31 
2- The PIO specialists be rotated between shore and 
sea PIO billets.32 
3- That Navy policy be relaxed to ~ermit PI0 1 s to 
have up to five year tours33 of duty.34 
Recommendations relating to the non-specialist full-
time PIO were: 
4- That they be kept in the billet for three yeara.35 
5- That newly reporting officers report with 
sufficient overlap prior to the departure of the out-
going PIO to permit an indoctrination period.36 
6- Ensure that non-specialist officers who have had 
postgraduate training in public relations be assigned 
PIC billets, interchanged with regular assignments.37 
Only one recommendation was made for the enlisted 
journalist. It is a large one, however. Pratt recommended 
that: 
7- Better use be made of enlisted journalists. And 
that change of duty orders come from Washington,38 
One recommendation, by Shipman, related to the former 
journalist who had achieved commissioned status: 
senior. 
31Ibid., p. 36 
32Ibid., p. 37 
33Normal tours are 2 years for junior officers, 3 for 
3~ratt, Navy Report, 22• cit., rec. 22 
35 36 Shipman, 22• cit., p. 43. Ibid. 
37Lockhart, 22• cit., Part II, para. 30. 
38Pratt, Navy Report, 22• cit., Part II, rec. 23. 
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8- Former journalists should be assigned to PIO 
billets whenever possible.~9 
Discussion 
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It is an old Navy tradition that junior officers be 
rotated among all duties in a ship or command. But it is not 
because of tradition that this recommendation for rotating PIO 
junior officers should be employed. These officers, in 
addition to fulfilling a PIO job, are also in training for 
higher rank and more responsibility. Complete knowledge of 
all aspects of the field, therefore, is a prerequisite. 
The second set of recommendations dealt with length of 
tours. Both were based on the fact that a PIO deals with 
people--and the more intimately he knows these contacts, the 
better job he can do. If a PIO is reassigned just after he 
has become accepted by community leaders and the media--and a 
new, unknown takes over--the overall program, in general, and 
the command, in specific, will suffer. 
Again, the individual must be thought of, however. It 
is known40 that most PI0 1 s are not in favor of a lengthy tour. 
One of the main reasons they are in the service is because of 
the chance "to travel." If the PIO became dissatisfied be-
cause of being in one place too lOng, the program would also 
suffer. A solution might be that the PI0 1 s desires are 
determined, and, if there is no objection, he be retained for 
39shipman, ~· cit., p. 49 
40personal discussions with Navy PI0 1 s. 
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an extended tour. 
A shorter tour is recommended for the non-specialist, 
as it would be detrimental to his career if he were kept 
away from sea-going line billets for too long a period. 
All the remainder of the recommendations in this 
area are self-explanatory and obvious, with one exception. 
That one deals with the enlisted journalist. 
Presently journalists are assigned to ships and 
activities. Where the difficulty arises is the case wherein 
a ship goes into dry dock for six months over-haul. The 
journalist has no work. Meanwhile, another ship engaged in a 
newsworthy venture may be short-handed for journalists. 
The solution would be to have journalists assigned 
from the Pentagon to ships about to be engaged in a news-
worthy cruise. When the cruise is completed, the journalist 
is again available for transfer. Maximum utilization of his 
service 1 s would be put to use. 
As with every plan, there is a dark side. In this 
case it would be the individual. He would be constantly on 
the move which is not conducive to a family life. Lower 
morale would be the result in most cases. As a solution to 
this problem, the journalist should be assigned to a shore 
command after a sea assignment of four months or more. The 
shore command should be his "home port" and after a six month 
period there, he would again be eligible for sea assignment. 
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Training 
A summation of the foregoing, and the need for training, 
are included in a statement by Major General Floyd Parks, USA, 
former Chief of Army Information, in Congressional testimony. 
The General stated: 
A need exists for a trained corps of public information 
officers who have the confidence of both the military and 
representatives of the news media and who know not only 
the requirements of the media, but the mechanics and 
timing involved in publishing or broadcasting news. These 
information officers must be fully acquainted with the 
complex structure of the military in order to know where 
to get the news, and they must be able to recognize the 
news values of military actions, which most military men 
do not, and be of enough rank and force to convince 
reluctant staff officers of the wisdom of releasing news 
promptly and properly. 
This need for trained information people within the 
military itself must be recognized if the information is 
to be gotten to the public. It must also be recognized 
that the activity requires a sizeable number of people.4l 
Recommendations 
A few of the recommendations in this area have already 
been implemented. These include the sending of PI0 1 s to Navy 
information courses, to the Armed Forces Staff College, and to 
civilian institutions such as Boston University's School of 
Public Relations and Communications. 
Other recommendations include: 
4lunited States Congress, House of Representatives, 
Committee on Government Operations, Availability of Information 
From Federal Departments and Agencies, Hearings before Sub-
committee, 84th Congress, 2d Session, July 9-12, 1956 (Washing-
ton: Government Printing Office, 1956), p. 1075. 
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1- Commanding officers should send their collateral 
duty PIC's to the Navy information course.42 
2- Non-specialist PIC's should be sent to the Navy 
information course prior to reporting for duty.43 
3- PIC's and journalists should be given two weeks 
training in practical media work.44 
4- PIC specialists should be given six months prac-
tical training in public information.45 
5- An exchange plan with private industry should be 
initiated.46 
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6- The PIC Manual should be required reading for all 
collateral duty PIC 1 s.47 
7- The curriculum at the Naval Academy should be 
studied to determine if public relations can be added.48 
Discussion 
If there ever was an Alice in Wonderland it would be 
a service officer (the average officer not the specialist 
trained in public relations) trying to deal with reporters 
or photographers.49 
This statement tells the reason why training is import-
ant--especially for the non-specialist. As for the specialist, 
42Bhipman, op. cit., p. 47 
43 
.. Ibid. I p. 42 
44pratt, Navy Report, £2• cit., Part II, rec. 18 
45shipman, £E• cit . , p. 4C 
46Pratt, Navy Report, £2• cit., Part I, reo. 1 
47shipman, 22· cit~, p. 47. 
48pratt, Navy Report, £2• cit., Part II, rec • . l5 
49Robert Lindsay, This High Name, Public Relations and 
the U. B. Marine Corps, (Madison: The University of Wisconsin 
Press 1956), p. 47 
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the only recommendation concerned training with industry. 
Both Shipman and Pratt dealt with this area. 
Pratt prefaced his recommendations on training with 
the thought that a training branch should be esta.blished in 
Chinfo to coordinate the program. 
Under the Pratt plan, certain key industries would 
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be contacted and asked to cooperate with the Office of 
Information. His original recommendation--in his Navy report--
was for an exchange plan, the Navy sending an officer to 
industry, and an industrial public relations man serving with 
the Navy for one month periods. However, he now states50 
that with the shortage of naval PIC 1 s, he feels it would be 
better to just have the Navy officers serve with industry. 
~Having an industrial man in a Navy office would tie up a 
PIO who would have to spend as much time indoctrinating the 
individual, as he would in learning any of the business.~ 
In addition to having the PIO receive excellent train-
ing in the industrial public relations organization, it would 
also spread the Navy's public information objectives in areas 
where future cooperation might be stimulated. 
The attendance at the Navy information course by non-
specialists and collateral duty PIC's should be carried out 
for obvious reasons, as should be making the Public Information 
manual required reading. 
50statement by Laurence 0. Pratt, personal interview, 
Cambridge, Massachusetts, May, 1958. 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
66 
"Since public relations is a command function, future 
commanders should be trained in the fundam-entals. 10 Thus, 
Pratt supports his recommendation for a public relations 
course at the Naval Academy. A former Chief of Information 
disagrees, however. Rear Admiral E. B. Taylor concedes that 
it is a good idea. However, Admiral Taylor points out that 
the present curriculum is overloaded, and, also, that such 
training would be more effective after the officers had served 
a short period with the fleet. 51 
51statement by Rear Admiral E. B. Taylor, USN, personal 
interview, Newport, Rhode Island, March, 1958. 
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The author takes exception to this latter statement on 
the grounds that public relations training would be extremely 
worthwhile for the embryo officer. His first assignment will 
be tough enough, but it would be facilitated if he knew how 
to form favorable opinions and attitudes in the minds of his 
men and also the means to higher morale. In addition, a mid-
shipman, or a new ensign stands out as a representative of 
the Navy. They should know how to deal with the public and 
with the media. 
Funds 
In 1950, the Congress imposed a limitation on the 
amount of money that can be expended on public information. 
For fiscal year 1958, the Defense Department is limited to 
spending $3,000,000. Of this, the Navy gets $816 1 667. How-
ever, the Navy must dkick-back" to the Defense Department 
$105,000 for the salaries of naval personnel serving in 
Defense public information, leaving the Navy a total of 
$711 1 667 for their world-wide program. For a comparison, 
civilian organizations such as American Iron and Steel 
Institute spend $1,500,500 to $2,000,000 annually. 
The Congressional limitation applies to salaries 
and other expenses. 52 All recommendations concerning f'unds 
relate to this limitation. 
52see Appendix c. 
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Recommendations 
1-The Secrectary of the Navy should urge the Secretary 
of Defense to work with Congress towards the elimination 
of the limitation.53 
2- That the Office of Information be divided into two 
sections--section one engaged in activities covered by 
the limitation, section two other activities.54 
Discussion 
It has been pointed out many times that this limitation 
is not practicable. For example, in Congressional testimony, 
Major General Floyd Parks said: 
I honestly think that if strictly and literally 
enforced, the entire annual limitation for the Army 
would be exhausted within two months. Should the Army 
then cease all service to the press and public for the 
next ten months?55 
Pratt also points out that the law is impossible to 
admi nister. For example, a Journalist collected personal 
items for the Ship's newspaper--an activity designed for ship 
morale and not covered by the limitation. Of ten items, 
six were suitable for use by the Fleet Home Town News Center. 
How should the Journalist's time be allocated? 
In addition to its impracticability, the law is costly 
to administer. The estimate for 1954 was $323,000. 
Under the reorganization of the Office of Information, 
53Pratt, Navy Report, QE• ~., Part II, rec. 25 
54Pratt, Defense Report, QE• cit., rec. 2 
55united States Congress, House of Representatives, 
Committee on Government Operations, July 9-12, 1956, £2• cit., 
p. 1079. 
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it was the hope of Pratt that the section engaged in activi-
ties covered by the limitation would be allowed to spend the 
maximum amount of funds available. The limitation, then, 
would not apply to the second section. Before implementation 
of this plan, Pratt suggests the Assistant Secretary of 
Defense for Legislation and Public Affairs rule on any pos-
sible adverse reaction in Congress if this were to be done. 
In general, it is recommended that the limitation of 
f unds be opposed before the Congress because it is a threat 
to national security, limits our ability to keep the public 
informed, is impractical to administer56 and is costly to 
administer. 
It is dangerous to national security, Pratt points 
out, because an uninformed public will let its armed forces 
decline below the minimum level of preparedness. 
Finally, Pratt states that the law doesn't accomplish 
what was intended--it hasn 1 t stopped service rivalry. Such 
cannot -be legislated.57 
IV. PUBLIC INFORMATION 
Public information, as has been pointed out, is the 
backbone of naval public relations. Today, the public 
56p R ratt, Defense eport, loc. cit. 
---
57statement by Laurence o. Pratt, personal interview, 
Cambridge, Massachusetts, May, 1958. 
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relations officer is titled "PIO" or public information 
officer. 
Public information covers the media field. The 
recommendations, therefore, fall into the following cate-
gories: press, queries, interviews, photography, magazines 
and books, and radio-television. 
Lockhart devoted exactly half of his study to the 
fi eld of public information. This was not startling, 
70 
however, since he was a professional newsman. The other re-
ports dealt mainly with the release of information (not to 
be confused with security) and press relations. 
Press 
The Navy is a daily source of news developments. 
These should be detected by the Navy and given to the public.58 
The vehicles for getting this information to the American 
citizens include radio, television, magazines, books and the 
press. For the relations with the latter, the civilian 
studies made a dozen recommendations. 
Recommendations 
1- The Office of Information should detect Navy news, 
prepare general press releases, and take all necessary 
steps to give the information the widest possible 
distribution. 59 
58Lockhart, 2E• cit., Part II, para. 64 
59Ibid. 
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2- A News Origination Branch should be established 
with specialists in newspaper, magazines and books, 
radio and television, and still and motion pictures 
included.60 
3- There should be two or three good ~legmen~ 
constantly at work in the Pentagon, pushing their 
way into Navy Department offices, finding out what is 
going on.61 
4- Press releases should be apportioned so that 
morning and evening papers share equally.62 
5- Fleet Commanders and District Commandants should 
be authorized to release feature stories directly to 
the media.63 
6- A weekly naval news column, with photographs, 
should be prepared for release.64 
7- Information about the Navy should be attributed 
to a special official by name.65 
8- Top media officials should be the friends of 
public relations officers and frequent contact should 
be had with them.66 
Discussion 
Recommendations 1, 2 and 3 1 all tie in with the idea 
of finding out the news and releasing it. It would be the 
60Pratt, Navy Report, ~· cit., rec. 3 
61Lockhart, ~· cit., Part II, para. 46 
62Ibid., para. 61 
63pratt, Navy Report, ~· £11., rec. 27 
64 Lockhart, £2· cit., Part II, para. 44 
65Ibid., para. 63 
66Ibid., para. 4 
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responsibility of the News Origination Branch to find through-
out the naval establishment stories which the public is en-
titled to know as taxpayers and which tend to build within 
the Navy a pride in service.67 The big advantage, adminis-
tratively, to accrue from this recommendation is that the 
~news origination~ branch would be divorced of the responsi-
bility of processing news queries. At present, the news 
branch all too often is snarled in a daily routine of 
t elephone answering. Thus, production of constructive pub-
licity is restricted. 
Upon development of the news, releases should be pre-
pared and should be released so that morning and evening 
papers receive an equal share of "scoops. 1 Lockhart stated 
that he had received complaints from Washington newsmen to 
the effect that there was an unfairly apportionment of re-
leases. The news men indicated that morning newspapers 
seem to be favored--and pointed out that there are more after-
noon newspapers with a greater total circulation.68 
Still on the subject of the "release 1 of news stories, 
the present policy in the Pentagon is that all national re-
leases must be issued through the Department of Defense. 
All information concerning the Naval Establishment 
of national interest or proposed for release to national 
news media (except spot news) will be forwarded to the 
67Pratt, Navy Report, £2• cit., reo. 3. 
68 Lockhart, £2• cit., Part II, para. 61 
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i i 1 69 Office of Information for coord nat on andre ease ••• 
It is further stated that: 
The release of information concerning the Armed 
Forces at the seat of government will be accomplished 
by the Office of Public Information, Department of 
Defense. Information concerning the Naval Establish-
ment proposed for release at the seat of government 
will be forwarded to the Chief of Information, 
Department of the Navy, for transmittal to the Depart-
ment of Defense.70 
Pratt feels that such "red tape" reduces the flow of 
usable news from the Fleets and Districts and diminishes 
incentive of public information personnel in the field. 
In addition, it tends to make a disproportionate 
number of releases come from Washington. This diminishes 
the newsworthiness of each release--and also means that the 
Washington area is flooded with military news, while other 
areas do not have their share. As the news travels from 
Washington it is cut down by each wire service editor--
resulting in a major story being limited to possibly two or 
three paragraphs by the time it reaches the west coast. 
Pratt, therefore, recommends that fleet commanders 
and district commandants be authorized to release feature 
stories, as well as spot news. 
There is another reason. Local reporters daily cover 
the naval commands. Under the present policy they must be 
satisfied with the small, routine stories. Whenever any 
69uo s. Navy Public Information Manual, £2• cit., p. 28. 
70Ibid. 
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major news breaks, i~ · is forwarded to Washington and they 
are "scooped~~ Such a policy does not engender good press 
relations. 
74 
Another method of helping the newsman get coverage of 
the Navy would be Lockhart's suggestion of a weekly column. 
This would deal, in language understandable and interesting 
to the layman, with naval developments, weapons, tactics, 
sc ience and history. 
One other recommendation also aimed at furthering good 
press relaflohs is that the rriendship of media officials should 
be cultivated. Both Lockhart, as mentioned, and Shipman?l dis-
cussed this area. Lockhart stated: MThe value in public 
relations of such personal contact and friendship cannot be 
overemphasized. 11ma 
The final recommendation in the press field dealt with 
attribution of news. Lockhart supported his suggestion by 
stating: 7:3 
The policy of attempting to attribute all information 
to a '0Navy spokesman 11 ••• is not a sound policy from the 
viewpoint of practicality and public relations. The 
press and radio do not like to use the term, strongly 
preferring to attribute information to a definite source. 
Also, it is not in accord with human nature to require 
news sources to be anonymous. 
This recommendation holds true for not only press 
releases, but also answers to press queries, to be dealt with 
71 Shipman, Q2• cit., p. 107 
72Lockhart, ~· cit., Part II, para. 7. 
7:3lbid., para. 6~. 
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in the next section of this report. Admiral Binford also 
had a recommendation which pertains to both areas; which 
is worth mentioning:74 
75 
If you are more accessible to the press than other 
agencies who are competing for the same newspaper space, 
you will get the breaks more often than not. Your 
credit rating is further enhanced when your attitude 
reflects a sympathetic understanding of the urgency of 
those press deadlines which hang over the reporter at 
all times. The news media is engaged in recording 
history in a hurry. 
Queries 
Hundreds of queries are received weekly from media 
representatives covering the Pentagon. These originate in 
many ways. A Washington correspondent may get the query 
from his home office in San Diego about a carrier sailing. 
Or, the query may be a follow-up of a speech made by a 
naval official, or Congressional testimony. 
In the Pentagon these queries are submitted to the 
appropriate service desk, for example, the Navy Press Desk. 
The latter, in turn, passes the query to the Navy Office of 
Information for reply. 
Only Pratt and Lockhart had recommendations in this 
field. 
74Binford, £2• cit., p. 12 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
Recommendations 
1- The Navy Press Desk should be authorized to go 
direct to any level of command within the Navy Depart-
ment to secure information.75 
76 
2- The Navy Department officials should inform the 
Chief of Information promptly of any information they 
release, since CHINFO frequently will be asked to 
confirm their action and furnish additional information. 76 
3- A responsible source for information about the 
Navy must be available at all hours of the day and night, 
seven days a week.77 
4- The spokesman for the Navy must be someone not 
likely to be reversed two hours later.78 
5- Responses to requests for information must be full 
and complete, no half truths.79 
6- PIO personnel should be assigned to fields of in-
formation in which large numbers of queries develop.80 
7- The use of 11 no comment 11 should be banned. 81 
8- The Press Desk must insure that they protect the 
security of inquiriea.82 
Discussion 
Approximately 30 per cent of the Navy's press branch's 
time is spent processing news queries. This area takes on 
added significance when it is realized that it is here that 
75Pratt, Defense Report, Q2• cit., reo. 
76Lockhart, Q2• cit., Part I, para. 17. 
77Ibid., para. 31. 78Ibid., para. 34. 
17. 
79 Ibid.,para.32. 
80Ibid., Part II, para. 62. 
82Ibid., para. 21. 
81 Ibid., para. 25. 
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77 
personal press relations are involved. Fast, efficient 
servicing of a query will get the Navy a friend. Poor, slow 
servicing will get an enemy. 
Pratt's suggestion in this field calls for authoriza-
tion for the Navy press desk to go directly to any Navy 
Department office for information. This would by-pass the 
Office of Information. Consequently, the Chief of Informa-
tion would lose all control over what is released. It has 
been suggested that the Chief of Information could keep the 
Navy Press Desk in the Department of Defense informed of Navy 
policy. However, Chinfo officers counter that it is hard 
enough to keep Chinfo officers informed, let alone officers 
in another executive department. Because of this, and be-
cause the Chief of Information--who is responsible for Navy 
information--would be by-passed, this recommendation must be 
turned down. 
Lockhart's recommendations are all general, and rather 
obvious ones which must be carried out in the interest of 
good public relations. Only a little discussion is necessary. 
In the first place, the Chief of Information must be the 
''Navy authority~ for dealing with the press. He must be so 
informed that it is never necessary for any higher authority 
to reverse any statement that he--or his representative--
makes. 
Secondly, to speed up handling of queries and provide 
better service, PIO personnel should be assigned to fields of 
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78 
information in which large numbers of queries develop. These 
PIC's would become Mspecialists~ in their field. They would 
be able to anticipate questions, and would build up a core of 
knowledge which would allow them to answer queries "off the 
top of their head.~ In addition, they would have established 
contacts in their field--officials who would know them and who 
would, therefore, furnish information more readily than to a 
s tranger. 
Thirdly, the 111 no comment" reply should be banned. 
Lockhart states that the PIO should: (1) say he doesn 1 t know 
but will get the answer, {2) should explain why he can 1 t 
answer--or, {3) should give the answer. 
Finally, Lockhart reports that there is a feeling 
amongst some of the newsmen that their query is not held in 
confidence. For example, the reporter will ask individually 
and exclusively for information on a subject. Perhaps the 
story is a ~hot~ one and the answer is "hot." Instead of 
giving the correspondent the answer, a press conference will 
be called and the issue presented ~o the entire press corps. 
The newsman sees his initiative thwarted, and, next time tries 
to by-pass channels to obtain his information. 
Interviews 
On many occasions information cannot be obtained through 
the simple process of question-answer. At such times it is 
necessary for the reporters to obtain interviews with naval 
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79 
officialso 
All too often, however, the correspondent telephones 
the official directly and sets up the interview--unknown to 
the Chief of Information. The first time the latter learns 
of the interview is when he reads the following morning's 
.r:ewspaper. 
Recommendation 
1- Requests for interviews should be channeled through 
the Office of Information, and, Chinfo should be informed 
of everything said at an interview.83 
Discussion 
There are two reasons for the preceding recommendation. 
First, Chinfo must be able to coordinate the release of in-
formation. It would be too bad if an official released 
information prematurely--when a much wider distribution of 
the publicity had been planned--maybe for many weeks. 
Second, the Chief of Information must know who says 
what to whom. This is because he must be able to know what 
has been released on every Navy subject, and, he must be 
''cut in 11 so he can confirm or deny further inquiries on the 
subject. 
One other point should be brought out in this area--
although it was not a subject for a recommendation. It 
concerns press conferences--the only other occasion when an 
83Ibid., para. 65. 
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official talks directly to the press and answers their 
questions1 in person. 
Lockhart touches on this subject when he states that 
"the Secretary of the Navy and the Chief of Naval Operations 
should talk frequently and frankly to the people about the 
state of the Navy."84 
An informal inquiry at the Navy Office of Information 
r evealed that these officials have held hardly more than one 
press conference in Washington since assuming office. And 
this is not uncommon. In Congressional testimony, the Chief 
Counsel of the "Moss Committee~ investigating the availability 
of information, John J. Mi tchell 1 stated: ''Secretary of the 
Army Brucker has had one press conference and Chief of Staff 
General Taylor has had one press conference in a year and a 
hAlf, t16Q 
If the Secretaries and the Chief of Naval Operations 
are the real representatives of the Navy--they must speak 
more often to the corps of press correspondents covering the 
Pentagon. Their words carry much more weight than a press 
release handed out in stereotyped style. 
84Ibid., Part I, para. 15~16. 
85united States Congress, House of Representatives, 
Committee on Government Operations, Availability of Informa-
tion From Federal Departments ~ Agencies, Hearings before 
Subcommittee, 85th Congress, let Session, July 1 and 8, 1957 
(Washington: Government Printing Office, 1957), p. 2399. 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
Photography 
Photography, in the true sense, has declined in 
importance in the Navy's information program over the past 
few years. Eyebrows will probably be raised over this 
81 
statement. Today, however, the pictorial branches of Chinfo 
are limited to newsworthy stills and cooperation with com-
mercial motion picture companies. All the remainder of their 
f ormer responsibilities--furnishing stills for the public and 
newsreels--have been shifted to other sections. 
Several recommendations, however, made by Lockhart 
and Pratt are still applicable. 
Recommendations 
1- More guidance should be given the field as to the 
types of newsworthy pictorial stills desired.86 
2- More training in dnews• photography should be 
given naval photographers.87 
3- A mobile task force to cover pictorially events 
occurring outside Washington should be formed.88 
4- A more aggressive program should be .undertaken 
to get more navy photographs in publications.89 
Discussion 
At present, the major i ty of still photo releases are 
the result of screening operational photographs for newsworthy 
86Pratt, Defense Report, £2• cit., rec. 16 
87Ibid. 88Ibid. 
89Lockhart, ~· cit., Part II, para. 57. 
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82 
material. Only on rare occasions is photo coverage specifi-
, ~: 
cally requested by Chinfo. 
All too often, newsworthy events go uncovered--or the 
coverage is not up to commercial news standards. To over-
come this, more guidance to the field and better training in 
news photography is required. The guidance to the field could 
be in the form of a small illustrated guide, lising the types 
of photographic material currently in demand by the press. 
Also, to help spread the word, the photographers who 
have been specially trained in news photography, should be 
reassigned among the maximum number of camera crews around the 
world. 
As for the mobile task force, this group would be com-
posed of the best available photographers and would be at the 
call of the information office only. This would guarantee 
that good photographers were available at all times to cover 
newsworthy events. 
After obtaining this new supply of newsworthy photo-
graphs, Chinfo should then carry on by commencing an 
aggressive program--as recommended by Lockhart--to get 
photographs favorable to the NavY in publications. Such a 
program should go beyond the "spot news" variety and include 
human interest and feature photographs. 
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Radio-Television 
Today, newsreels are made for television, with motion 
picture theaters a second consideration. Therefore, responsi-
bility for newsreels in Ohinfo has shifted to the radio-
television branch. 
Only Pratt had any concern for television. But this 
concern was of major importance. Pratt states:90 
The growth of television has been unparalleled in 
the history of information media. Its impact on 
reading habits and family life has also been enormous. 
We are only half doing our public information job if 
we fail adequately to recognize the importance of this 
medium, and organize to service it in a way that fits 
the requirements of the medium. 
Recommendations 
1- Have the present Chief of the Pictorial Branch be 
assigned also as Chief of Radio-TV to assure maximum 
cross-use of facilities.91 
2- Assign the responsibility for cooperation with 
television producers to the Radio-TV Branch~ whether 
cooperation involves live programs or film.~2 
3- Representatives of the Radio-TV branch should 
have offices in Los Angeles and New York to provide 
on-the-scene cooperation.93 
Discussion 
It might be stated that these three recommendations 
should be omitted from this study. The reason--they have 
90Pratt, Defense Report, Q2• cit., rec. 15. 
91Ibid. 
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been, or cannot be, implemented. 
As for recommendation number one, with the shifting 
of newsreel responsibility from pictorial to the radio-TV 
branch, there no longer is a conflict between the branches. 
84 
As for the second recommendation, it has already been 
implemented as stated above. 
The final recommendation has also been implemented. 
As mentioned in the organization section of the Administra-
tive area, there are branch offices in New York and Los 
Angeles. These offices, among other responsibilities, handle 
on-the-spot cooperation with radio-TV representatives. 
Therefore, in this field it can be concluded that 
there were no recommendations which need to be carried out. 
However, those that were made are still applicable and their 
implementation should not be countermanded~ 
Magazines and Books 
Regardless of the growth of television, people still 
read magazines and books. This important communication field 
also, therefore, should be cultivated. 
Recommendations 
1- Magazines and book branches of each service should 
band together to promote current Defense Department 
objeotives.94 
94Ibid., reo. 20 
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2- PIC's in the Magazine and Book branch should take 
more initiative in calling on magazine and book pub-
lishers, editors,._ staff writers, and free lance 
correspondents.9o 
3- Remove some of the limitations placed on signed 
articles by top defense officials.96 
4- Have selected naval reservists serving on 
magazine staffs do active duty in Chinfo.97 
Discussion 
85 
Pratt's first recommendation is a fine one in theory. 
However, in practice it has not proven practicable. Suffice 
it to say that each service wants to come out looking the 
best--to stimulate enlistments and reenlistments in its 
ranks. 
The second recommendation also can not be endorsed--
through no fault of its own. Discussions with members of the 
magazine-book branch indicate that they would be all too 
willing to call more often on magazine officials. But limi-
tations of time, money and personnel prohibit it. 
For example, the Navy branch has but one officer. If 
he spent as much time as was necessary calling on magazine 
people, his office would go untended for days on end. 
~Initiative~ therefore, is not the target, rather it is more 
people, time and money to allow the recommendation to be 
carried out. 
95Ibid. 96Ibid. 
97Pratt, Navy Report, 22• £11., Part II, reo. 7. 
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Pratt had one last recommendation in this field. It, 
also, is impracticable. It has been so proven. 
The Navy investigated this recommendation. It was 
found that only a few of the professional writers are mem-
bers of an active reserve outfit--therefore eligible for 
active duty. Of the few available, there could be no agree-
ment upon a period of time when all could take active duty 
in the Pentagon. They would have been, therefore, straggling 
in throughout the year and no organized program would have 
been possible. There was one other drawback. The writers 
themselves felt that they would all be exposed to the same 
material and that there were only so many stories available. 
Even all of these could not be placed on the market at the 
same period as they would "flood the demand." Some of the 
writers would suffer by having their stories killed. 
One last point, the writers also mentioned that if 
there was newsworthy material, their publication would cover 
it officially and no special program was necessary. 
Miscellaneous 
There are three recommendations in the miscellaneous 
area which bear mention. 
Recommendations 
1- Prohibit commanding officers from barring newsmen 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
from any area under their jurisdiction.98 
2- Bring servicemen back to this country to apB~ar 
at press conferences and on radio and television. 
3- Relax the style of letters written for civilian 
consumption.lOO 
Discussion 
It could be anticipated that the "don 1 t bar newsmen" 
suggestion came from Lockhart, the professional newsman. 
Lockhart, naturally, would like to see such a policy. But, 
from a military and security point of view it would not be 
possible. If implemented, it would mean that newsmen would 
have the run of military installations. Today, too much 
classified work is being undertaken on naval stations to 
permit such a procedure. 
Lockhart's other recommendation, however, that 
servicemen be brought back to this country to appear at 
press conferences and on radio and television programs has 
87 
some merit. However, funds would limit this to some extent. 
Perhaps it would be possible for utilizing servicemen home 
on leave. Possibly they could be granted extra leave if they 
qualified and if they appeared on public programs. 
The last recommendation, also by Lockhart, is in the 
public relations field. All too often letters destined for 
98Lockhart, £2• cit., Part II, para. 18. 
99Ibid., para. 52. 
lOOibid., para. 50 
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88 
delivery outside the military bear the formal, strictly 
impersonal tone of naval, or other military official corres-
pondence. This style may be good far official orders, but 
not for civilian consumption. 
A letter can be firm and still be friendly. It can 
be factual without being lifeless. Bluntness is never good 
in dealing with newsmen--or anyone else, for that matter. 
PI0 1 s should remember that their correspondence is 
particularly susceptible to getting into print or sound over 
the radio. The correspondence should be pitched between the 
11 formal 10 and the ''familiar" tone--neither brusk nor namby-
pam by. 
V. CIVIL RELATIONS 
Civil relations is often entitled community relations, 
the term most used in industry. 
There is one great difference between Civil Relations, 
in the military, and Community Relatione, in industry. This 
difference lies in the scope of the field. In industry 
community relations is confined to the '1oommunity 19--while in 
the Navy it involves all civilians, anywhere. 
The u. s. Navy Public Information Manual states that 
the Civil Relations Division of the Office of Information: 
will administer the Navy Community Relations Program 
and the Navy Guest Cruise Program; coordinate special 
orientation visits of individual civilians or groups to 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
89 
naval installations; maintain liaison with and conduct 
programs of cooperation with all civilian groups and 
non-governmental agencies which do not fall within the 
category of public information medial and answer queries 
emanating from the general public.lO 
As can be seen, civil relations covers a wide field. 
The recommendations, for example, deal with speakers' programs, 
bands, parades, holiday programs, open houses, athletics, 
exhibits, national organizations, field administration, and 
the Joint Civilian Orientation Program.l02 
Speakers' Programs 
Recommendations 
1- In telling the story of the Navy, the Secretary 
of the Navy, a civilian, should be the forerunner for 
Navy public relations and, as such, must speak out.l03 
2- The Navy's speakers' program could be improved if 
there was greater participation of enlisted men.l04 
101u. s. Navy Public Information Manual, ~· cit., 
Po 14o 
102The Joint Civilian Orientation Conference (JCOC) 
is convened by the Secretary of Defense to promote public 
understanding of the United States defense program. Repre-
sentative citizens participate in the two or three day program 
in Washington and the eight day field trip to Army, Navy, Air 
Force and Marine Corps installations. 
103 Lockhart, £E• cit., Part I, para. 15. 
104Ibid. 1 Part II; para. 36. 
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3- A questionnaire form should be prepared on which 
audience reaction, press coverage, etc., can be 
recordedol05 
4- The Speaker 1 s Guide should be issued six times a 
year at a minimum.l06 
Discussion 
It is only natural that the Secretary of the Navy, 
who is titular head of the Navy, should be the service 1 e 
number one speaker. Also, because public relatione in the 
Navy is the direct responsibility of the Secretary, he should 
show the way in any speaking program. 
This program, today, is not an organized one. 
Directives and regulations in the U. S. Navy Public Informa-
tion Manual give guidance. But, some commands lack any type 
of speakers program. Some have excellent ones. 
All, however, could improve their programs by adding 
enlisted speakers. As Lockhart states: MI think the Navy 
would do well on all occasions when it furnishes speakers to 
send out an able enlisted man with every officeroM Such a 
plan would be good for the morale of enlisted men, it would 
be good for the Navy, and it would be good public relations. 
Pratt 1 s first recommendation would fill two purposes. 
First, it would give the speech writers--who too often work 
in a vacuum--some indication as to the acceptance of the 
l05Pratt, Defense Report, £2• £11., rec. 12 
106Ibid. 
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speech. And, by surveying the newspaper coverage, they could 
ascertain if their message had been correctly interpreted. 
The second purpose would be to allow the officers in 
the Office of Informatio~, or other public information offices, 
to judge if the appearance was a success--both from the view-
point of the speaker's performance, and from the support given 
by the sponsoring agency. Occasionally, a top speaker shows 
up at what has been heralded an important meeting, only to 
find that his audience can be counted on his fingers. Such 
a situation results in a waste of the speaker's time and in 
stifling his enthusiasm for future appearances. 
Pratt's last recommendation is also for the aid and 
benefit of the speech writers. The Navy puts out many types 
of speech material--such as copies of top speeches made by 
Navy officials, a pocket speaker's guide, and Navy Public 
Statements--but it is not done regularly. Last year, for 
example, the Navy Public Statements was issued in January, 
another three months later, in April, and the third, six 
months later in October. 
What Pratt recommends is that a small, helpful guide 
be issued at least six times a year. Its circulation should 
be limited to those who can make bona fide use of it in the 
preparation of speeches, thus keeping its production cost down. 
All of these proposals would assist 1n getting out the 
word. 
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Bands, Parades and Holidays 
Special events, in any form, are the responsibility of 
the Civil Relations Division of the Office of Information. 
High among the list of these are band performances, parades 
and special participation in holiday programs. Toward these 
three types of Navy community relations, Lockhart directed 
some recommendations. 
Recommendations 
1- The Navy band should tour principal cities 
constantly and in Washington in the summer it should 
play outdoor concerts.l07 
2- Navy units should parade often.l08 
3- The Navy should tie in with appropriate holidays 
in a way that will present the Navy to the public.l09 
Discussion 
Recommendations one and two have already been 
implemented. However~ more can be done in the way of parade 
participation. 
On special occasions, such as Armed Forces Day, the 
Navy hasn't sufficient units to go around and some requests 
from civic organizations must be turned down. However, not 
much is done during the remainder of the year to stimulate 
interest in Navy parades. For example, when a new carrier 
107 Lockhart, ~· cit., Part II, para. 39. 
108Ibid., para. 40 109Ibid., para. 42 
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visits a port ' tor the first time, excellent publicity could 
be gained by having the crew parade. 
Parades, als~ should not be limited to the continental 
United States. Visits to foreign ports by U. S. Navy ships 
are excellent occasions for parades also. 
Besides parades, the Navy can tie-in in other ways 
with holiday celebrations. Special exhibits, window displays, 
s peakers, etc., all would lend a nautical air to the pro-
ceedings. 
Open Houses 
Another excellent public relations program involves 
open houses--visits to naval installations or ships. These 
can be in many forms, but much care must be taken to ensure 
success. One cannot just open the gates, or lower the gang-
plank, and have a successful open house. 
Open houses consist of arranged tours by school groups, 
civic organizations--or just plain citizens. The objectives 
of open house and ship tours are to create a better under-
standing of the operation of the Navy, dispel misconceptions, 
create prospective recruits and officers, and demonstrate 
the efficiency and power of the Navy.llO 
110 Canfield, op. cit., p. 624 
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Recommendations 
1- Civilian inspection of Navy installations and 
participation in Navy activities should be encouraged 
in every way.ll.L 
2- Don't neglect the many visitors to the nation's 
Capital.ll2 
Discussion 
94 
Some naval installations, such as the Naval Base at 
Norfolk, Virginia--the world's largest--have continual open 
house. Several tours are conducted daily at stipulated times. 
Many activities, however, have open house but once a 
year--on Armed Forces Day. With very little effort they could 
have open house at least once a week, for example on Sunday 
as most Army NIKI sites do. In addition to providing a chance 
for the public to get to know arid see the Navy, it would also 
be useful in keeping the Sunday 11 duty section" busy. This 
group must be held on the station in case of emergency--and 
assigning the responsibility of conducting civilian tours would 
keep them busy, thus improving their morale. Also, it has been 
shown by psychological studies that having persons participate--
in this case selling the Navy to the public--makes them a 
stronger supporter of the organization. This plan, therefore, 
might instill a greater Navy spirit in the enlisted personnel 
and stimulate reenlistments. 
111Lockhart, .QE• cit., Part II, para. 37 
ll2Ibid., para. 32. 
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95 
In Lockhart's other recommendation he points out a 
great failing all the military services have. It is odd how 
the services--with their large public relations staffs in 
Washington--think only about public visiting in areas outside 
of the Capital. 
Thousands of visitors annually come to Washington from 
all over to see how their government works. They go to 
various spots of interest. For example, to the FBI and take 
a tour, have their finger prints taken, see the crime labora-
tory, the pistol range, etc. They then go away impressed by 
the FBI and are proud of it. 
But one doesn't see any tours of the Pentagon. One or 
two tours a day, plus a few exhibits in the concourse, would 
show the public how the Navy--and the other services--conduct 
business at command headquarters. 
Athletics 
Recommendations 
1- Participation of Navy teams in athletic events 
should be general practice.ll3 
2- Naval installations should offer their facilities 
for civilian athletic events.ll4 
3- All-Navy finals should be rotated among the 
various principal United States cities.ll5 
113Ibid., para. 38. 114Ibid. 115Ibid. 
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Discussion 
Members of the Navy presently participate in a great 
many athletic events. These are usually of Olympic variety 
or national meets. Greater participation in local sporting 
functions by members of naval facilities could be encouraged. 
Also, again aiming at bettering relations with the 
public and having the public always conscious of the Navy, 
naval facilities could open their athletic centers for use 
by civilian teams, such as the Little League. This latter 
proposal, also, would instill interest in the younger genera-
tion--a most suitable and influential audience--which in later 
years might handsomely reward the Navy for its effort. 
As for the final recommendation, All-Navy sporting 
finals are usually held at large naval installations on the 
east or west coast. There are two sides to the argument of 
Lockhart that they be held in principal cities of the United 
States. 
On one hand, holding them at naval installations allows 
the men of the Navy to witness the finals. This creates more 
interest in Navy sports and is better for morale. 
On the other side, is the argument that holding them 
in connection with local carnivals, or similar celebrations, 
would create better public awareness of the Navy. This is 
undoubtedly true. 
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A compromise, therefore, is in order. The events could 
be staged in cities in which, or near which, there are large 
naval installations, at the time of a local celebration. Or 
perhaps, the ci~could be interested in staging a celebration 
in honor of the All-Navy finals. 
At all these events it would be worthwhile to have 
Navy exhibits and perhaps a Navy parading unit to further 
make the public aware of the Navy. 
Exhibits 
Naval exhibits and displays may range from a recruiting 
poster on the side of a truck, or the Navy art exhibit known 
as 11 0peration Palette, '1 or a display of a guided missile in 
the lobby of a building. 
Since preparation of exhibits strictly for public 
showing comes under the Congressional limitation of public 
information funds, 116 the use of exhibits is restricted. 
However, exhibits not specially prepared for public use--sucl1 
as a guided missile--can be put to good service. 
Exhibits are placed in two ways. One is to have the 
Navy contact an agency regarding the exhibit. The other is 
to have the agency request one from the Navy. 
ll6see p. 67 and Appendix C of this report. 
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Recommendation 
1- More careful advance investigation of certain 
types of events should be made to reduce to a minimum 
reversals in decisions.ll? 
Discussion 
Pratt 1 s recommendation would overcome one defect in 
the eXhibits program--other than the lack of £unds. 
On occasion, a request for an exhibit is approved, 
only to have later circu~stances negate the acceptance. 
Better investigation of the event would eliminate this, 
98 
thus preventing a bad opinion of the Navy from being formed. 
National Organizations 
Relations with national organizations is a two~way 
proposition. By cooperating the Navy furnishes the organi-
zations with interesting events, exhibits or trips. In 
return, the Navy gets another opportunity to sell itself. 
Recommendations 
1- The Office of Information should obtain more 
information about the kinds of material and/or events 
desired by the organization.ll8 
2- Additional activity among women's clubs is 
suggested.ll9 
117pratt, Defense Report, ~· cit., rec. 14. 
118Ibid., rec. 11. ll9Ibid. 
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Discussion 
The Office of Information currently deals with 
national organizations, filling their requests for speakers 
and visits to naval installations. However, they could 
assist the PIO and commanding officers in the field by find-
ing out what cooperation is desired by the organizations on 
the local level. Also, what types of material they would 
l ike to receive. This information would be passed on to the 
naval installations for implementation. 
As for the increased activity with women's clubs, Pratt 
points out that there is additional need for support for and 
from families of servicemen. To assist in achieving this, 
more Navy awareness in the minds of mothers and wives is 
necessary. This would be partially accomplished through work-
ing with the women's clubs. 
Field Organization 
As mentioned in the Administrative Section of this 
Chapterl20 more emphasis on civil relations is needed in the 
field. Shipman, who had little to say in this area, concen-
trated his recommendations on .suggestions for the administra-
tion of community relations programs in the field. Lockhart 
furnished two additional points. 
120see page 53. 
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Recommendations 
1- The Office of Information must be the center for 
inspiring community relations activity, but the bulk of 
the work in this activity should be done in the field.l21 
2- Field PIC's must be on the alert for opportunities 
to fit the Navy into the activities and life of their 
communitiesol22 
3- The Chief of Naval Operations should point out 
to the Fleet Commanders how their commands can help 
community relations within continental United States. 1 23 
4- Appropriate line and staff officers should build 
and/or maintain liaison, at the state and regional level, 
with civilian organizations.l24 
5- Bureaus and Offices should be urged to intensify 
their field activities' community relations programs.l25 
6- The Chief of Information should arrange a one day 
community relations meeting at each of the continental 
District Headquarters for commanding officers and PIC's 
of at least all major commands within the District.l26 
7- Commandants should use their inspector general, 
coordinators of Naval Reserve, and public information 
officers to inspect community relations programs in 
their Districts.l27 
Discussion 
All of the recommendations are aimed at one target, 
namely, increasing community relations in the field. Guidance 
121Lockhart, Q2• cit., Part II, para. 60. 
l22Ibid. 
123shipman, £2• cit., p. 74. 
l24Ibid., p. 33 125Ibid., p •• 40-41. 
126Ibid., p. 77 127Ibid., p. 71. 
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for this, however, must come from the Pentagon. 
The Fleet Commanders could assist community relations 
programs by urging their commanding officers to initiate 
letter writing campaigns to the kinfolk of personnel aboard 
their ships. Or, as another example, urging their commanding 
officers to participate more in the "Guest CruiseM program.l28 
Also, to prepare distinctive and attractive certificates for 
presentation to civilians who cruise in their ships. 
The other recommendations are self-explanatoryo How-
ever, a word needs to be said about the use of inspectors. 
They would serve two purposes. First, they would report to 
their Commandants the effectiveness of field activities' 
community relations programs. Second, they would allow the 
District PIC's to learn about especially effective projects 
and to pass these along to other commands within the District. 
Joint Civilian Orientation Conferences 
Annually a large number of representative civilians 
are invited by the Secretary of Defense to participate in 
Joint Civilian Orientation Conferences (JCOC). After brief-
ings in the various branches of the Department of Defense, 
128commanding officers of the larger ships report 
billets available in their ships whenever they are about to 
depart on a cruise--be it one day, a week or several months. 
The Secretary of the Navy then invites civilians to be a guest 
of the Navy for these cruises. The guests only pay for their 
meals. 
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the group visits naval, army, air force and marine installa-
tions for a week. 
Recommendation 
1~ A major television network should be interested in 
filming a JCOC for broadcasting purposes. Copies of the' 
film could be made available for later distribution.l29 
Discussion 
The effect of the JCOC has been excellent on the 
l imited numbers who have been exposed to it. Wider dissemina-
tion, however, would help keep the American public informed of 
developments within the Navy--and the other services. 
The JCOC also typifies integration at its best. And 
the film would portray the role of the Navy and its coordina-
tion with the other services. 
In conclusion, it can be stated that through civil 
relations, or community relations, the Navy comes in closest 
contact with the publico Therefore, an effective civil rela-
tions program is absolutely essential if the Navy is to 
inform the public concerning the New Nuclear Navy and to 
create in the eyes of the public a favorable opinion of the 
Navy. 
l29Pratt, Defense Report, Q2• cit., rec. 10. 
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VI. INTERNAL RELATIONS 
The internal relations of the (Navy) is one of the 
most important elements of the public relations program 
of the (Navy). If (naval) personnel have high morale, 
if they are loyal to the (Navy) and believe in it, they 
will pass along their enthusiasm to their civilian 
families and frienda.l30 
The further significance of well-informed naval 
personnel in a sound public relations program is emphasized 
by General Matthew B .. Ridgway, who stated: ''When troops 
understand fully, there is less occasion for complaint and 
speculation, with resulting less criticism from the public, 
the press and Congress."l31 
General Ridgway left out one category--the troops 
themselves. When the troops are fully informed and have 
high morale, they accept Navy policy better, and they re-
enlist--making for a more effective Navy. 
Perhaps, before examining the recommendations in 
103 
this area which cover the internal Navy PIO system, internal 
information, the Naval Reserve, and the reenlistment problem, 
one should consider a statement made by Pratt.. He said: 
It is axiomatic that strong public relations starts 
with the internal relations program. If this is true 
in private industry, it is doubly true in the armed 
forces. Put in one group all the men who are serving 
or have served with the armed forces; add their 
families; then add their circle of intimate friends 
130canfield, ~· cit., p .. 411 
131rbid., citing General Matthew B. Ridgway. 
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and you come close to a figure that equals the total 
population of the country. What people believe abo~g2 the (Navy) can make or break your public relations. 
Conferences and Seminars 
Recommendations 
104 
1- The field PI0 1 s are on Chinfo 1 s team and The Chief 
of Information must know them, how they play and what 
rules their commanding officers are forcing them to play.l33 
2- A series of two-day seminars should be organized 
in key spots around the world to be attended by senior 
Commanders, PI0 1 s and selected journalists.l34 
3- Public information officer meetings should be 
held at least every six months in Washington by the 
Chief of Information personally for the exchange of 
information of mutual benefit.l35 
Discussion 
Some may wonder why the internal Navy PIO system, and 
these recommendations, have been included in the internal 
relations section in lieu of the administrative. The reason 
is that the Internal Relations Division of the Office of 
Information "will effect liaison and coordination and coordina-
tion with the bureaus and offices of the Navy Department, and 
between the Department and all commands afloat and ashore ••• " 
according to the U. S. Navy Public Information Manual. 
Under· this charter, the Internal Relations Division 
handles all coordination with field PI0 1 s--unlees it is for 
132pratt, Defense Report, £2• cit., reo. 29 
133 Lockhart, 22· cit., Part II, para. 27. 
134pratt, Navy Report, 22· cit., rec. 17 
135Ibid., rec. 9 
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media business, in which case the public information division 
is authorized to carry out direct liaison. 
For the Internal Relations Division director to 
effectively guide field PI0 1 s, in the name of the Chief of 
Information, he must know the personalities he is dealing 
with. He must get to know each and every PIO and what their 
particular problems are. When he knows their problems, he 
can bring the weight of Chinfo and the Pentagon in play to 
assist in the solution. 
There are several reasons why the world-wide and 
Washington PIO and commanding officers' conferences should be 
held. 
The field meetings would allow the PI0 1 s to have 
personal contact with the Chief of Information. It would 
raise the profession in the eyes of the senior commanders--
the fact that they could talk with the head of Navy informa-
tion. 
Such meetings would allow the Chief of Information to 
announce and discuss the Navy's public relations policies--
and to straighten out any local problems which may be at 
variance with overall policy. 
· The Washington seminars would serve similar purposes. 
On these occasions, however, only the PI0 1 s would be involved. 
Field PI0 1 s are constantly urging that liaison between their 
offices and the Office of Information be strengthened. And 
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that they be kept more fully informed on Navy public informa-
tion and overall policies. 
The other services bring their PI0 1 s to Washington 
often. For example, at the Armed Forces PIO office in Los 
Angeles, the Air Force representative returns to the Pentagon 
about every six weeks, and the Marine, twice a year. The 
Navy PIO had never been back.l~6 
The Washington conferences would serve two primary 
purposes--they would ensure that the PIC's were kept up to 
date on current developments, and, they would keep the Chief 
of Information informed on developments outside Washington. 
Internal Information 
Each bureau within the Navy Department, including the 
Office of Information, publishes a magazine or newsletter. 
At present there is no coordination of these publications. 
Nor is there any planned program for the dissemination 
of information for use in navy publications throughout the 
service. A clip sheet entitled 1 Sea Clipper" was formerly 
published by the Bureau of Naval Personnel. However, with 
the establishment of the D.efense Department's Armed Forces 
Press Service clip sheet, the "Sea Clipper" was abolished. 
136Ibid. 
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Recommendations 
1- That the Secretary determine whether or not the 
Chief of Information has full responsibility in the 
107 
field of internal information. If so, direct the Navy 
Department to cooperate with the Office of Information.l37 
2- The Office of Information should plan and prepare 
material for a continuous campaign for dissemination of 
Navy information to Navy media.l38 
3- That the Chief of Naval Operations explain to all 
commanding officers the importance of disseminating the 
Navy information through their respective media.l39 
4- That the Internal Activity of the Bureau of Naval 
Personnel be transferred to the Office of Information.l40 
5- A new branch should be established to advise and 
evaluate ship and station newspapers and departmental 
publications of a "house organ" type.l4l 
Discussion 
As mentioned in the introduction of this section, many 
publications are distributed by naval activities and there is 
little coordination. 
Shipman commences his recommendations with the thought 
that the Secretary of the Navy should determine who has the 
responsibility for internal publications. The reason for this 
is obvious. It is impossible to conduct an effective and 
137shipman, Qe· cit., pp. 87-88. 
l38Ibid., p. 89 139Ibid., p. 91. 
l40pratt, Defense Report, ~· cit., rec. 5. 
14lpratt, Navy Report, ~· cit., rec. 12. 
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efficient internal program with a multitude of bosses. 
Shipman felt that once the Office of Information was de-
termined to be responsible for the internal information, it 
should then commence a vigorous program. 
This would consist of preparing and distributing in-
formation for use by internal publications of ships and 
stations. To ensure that proper dissemination of this 
material is made, commanding officers would be informed of 
its importance. This would almost guarantee that they would 
personally see that the information was used in their publi-
cations. 
Pratt's first recommendation goes back to Shipman's 
first--that the Office of Information ought to be responsible 
for all internal information. This would be in keeping with 
civilian organizations in which internal publications are the 
responsibility of the public relations divisions. Pratt also 
stated that close coordination of the external and internal 
information activities will greatly increase the effectiveness 
of both and can result in economies. 
It is doubtful, however, that the Bureau of Naval 
Personnel would ever agree to losing its internal information 
program--at least until all other bureaus and offices also 
transfer their internal publications to Chinfo. Such, obvious-
ly, is not desirable as Chinfo would be bogged down with 
technical--as 9pposed to informational--publications. 
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Pratt's final recommendation, however, should be 
implemented. This has been informally attempted in Chinfo, 
but there should be a formalized project underway to 
evaluate and advise ship and station publications. 
Naval Reserve Public Relations Program 
All the members of the Naval Reserve are emissaries 
of the Navy. However, they are not organized for public 
r elations purposes. The only organized public relations 
program in the Naval Reserve involves the Naval Reserve 
Public Relations Companies, also known as NRPRC 1 s. 
This was one of the areas on which Shipman concen-
trated. Pratt had but one recommendation, Lockhart none. 
Recommendations 
1- Intensify and expand the NRPRC to a total of 180 
units in principal cities.l42 
2- Officers in Charge of Reserve Training Centers 
should be made responsible for activations.I4~ 
3- That an activation kit be prepared by the Office 
of Information.l44 · 
4- That a minimum of 75 per cent of the new members 
be experienced in public relations.l45 
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5- That a maximum of 35 per cent of the members be 
in the captain, commander, lieutenant commander bracket.l46 
1426hi;Eman, op. cit., p. 69, and p. 8. 
143Ibid., p. 9. 144~., p. 12. 
145Ibid., p. 15. l 46Ibid., p. 16. 
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6- That Reserve PIO specialist designators (1655) be 
assigned to the inactive reservists according to mobil-
ization requirements and the qualifications of the 
officers.l47 
7- That six carefully selected officers from NRPR0 1 s 
representing geographical areas, be brought to the 
Pentagon to assist in developing a Naval Reserve public 
relations program.l48 
Discussion 
Shipman was concerned with the activation and admin-
istration of the Naval Reserve Public Relations Companies. 
He felt the number of units should be increased so that there 
was a unit in every city in which there was a Naval Reserve 
training center, plus other cities. 
Prior to making his 1952 report, Shipman had investi-
gated the NRPRO program and had found out such facts as: but 
25 per cent of the members are qualified for active duty as 
PI0 1 s and that 75 per cent were in grades of lieutenant com-
mander and higher. 
For these reasons, in 1955 he reexamined the two 
areas. He found that a recommendation had been sent to the 
Bureau of Naval Personnel regarding qualifications--and the 
qualifications have been changed--but, that nothing had been 
done regarding rank structure. As for the latter, new members 
with senior ranks are only accepted if a vacancy exists in 
l47Ibid., p. 37. 
148pratt, Navy Report, £2• cit., Part II, reo. 13. 
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their rank. However, there has not been a weeding out of 
senior officers--unless passed over for promotion. 
Shipman saw the NRPR0 1 s existing for two reasons. 
lll 
First, as a ready mobilization force. Second, to assist the 
Office of Information, on a voluntary basis, in the dissemina-
tion of information concerning the Navy.l49 
Pratt differed sharply in his recommendation with 
Shipman 1 s last statement regarding 11 vo'luntar;y'1 basis. He 
felt that a vigorous program could be conducted by the reserve 
officers. "We should use to the fullest possible extent," he 
said, "the abilities of some of the outstanding brains in 
public relations in the country, available to us in these 
(NRPRC) companies."l50 
An example of the Pratt plan can be seen in the 
Program for Harvard College in which a large sum of money is 
being raised for the institution. At the commencement of the 
Program, some 200 outstanding alumni--selected from Who 1 s Who 
and other sources--were brought to the institution for a 
conference. Upon return home, each commenced a vigorous cam-
paign in support of the Program. 15l 
Under Pratt's plan, the reserve officers would be 
brought to Washington for three weeks. The first week would 
be devoted to indoctrination in the Office of Information; 
l49shipman, ~· cit., p. 6. 
150pratt, loc. cit. 
15lstatement of Laurence 0. Pratt, personal interview, 
Cambridge, Massachusetts, May, 1958. 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
the final two to developing programs and activities for the 
NRPRC 1 s. 
As stated earlier, there are thousands of Naval 
Reservists--and each can do a selling job for the Navy, if 
they know what to sell. 
Recruiting and Reenlistment 
112 
The dividing line between over-all Navy publicity and 
recruiting publicity is often too narrow to recognize. Navy 
publicity serves three purposes: to inform the taxpayer how 
his dollars are being spent, to get support from the public 
and Congress, and to interest prospective enlistees and 
officers and to retain those already in the Navy. 
It is in this latter area that recruiting publicity 
and public information overlap. For example, both the Office 
of Information and the Recruiting Service are requesting 
cooperation from media--to the great irritation of the media 
people. 152 
Pratt's recommendations are aimed at overcoming the 
duplication and improving the program at the same time. 
Recommendations 
1- Move the Recruiting Publicity Branch from the 
Bureau of Naval Personnel to the Office of Informat1on.l5~ 
152Ib1d., rec. 6. 
15~Ib1d. 
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2- The Secretary of the Navy, with the advice of the 
Chief of Information, the Assistant Secretary for 
Personnel, and the Chief of Naval Personnel, should 
appoint a special task force to restudy the reenlistment 
problem, prepare a comprehensive public and internal 
relations program, and recommend a permanent set-up with-
in Chinfo to implement internal aspects of the program.l54 
3- The Navy should start at the earliest possible 
moment production of a half-hour television show for 
recruiting purposes.l55 
Discussion 
Experience in industry has proven the success of the 
separation of sales (recruiting) and the advertising (publi-
city) divisions. In addition, the Office of Information has 
material and personnel which can augment tne recruiting 
publicity branch--and which can implement the program nation-
wide, working in cooperation with recruiters. 
The special task force, according to Pratt, would 
help provide training and knowledge to men who might them-
selves become the future leaders of internal relations. The 
task force also would study why men leave the Navy, inter-
preted in human terms. 
Pratt concludes that the Office of Information must 
know the problems of the Bureau of Naval Personnel in order 
to have better public and internal relations. This, also, 
would be discovered via the special task force. 
l54Ibid., reo. 19. 
155Ibid., reo. 26. 
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One of the areas where greater emphasis could be 
placed by Chinfo in behalf of recruiting is in television. 
Pratt concedes that there are "Navy'' programs now on tele-
vision--Navy Log 1 Silent Service and Victory at Sea, to name 
a few. However, his idea is to have the Navy have its own 
program under Navy control. This would be a ''documentary" 
film in the sense that it would accurately reflect the 
Navy of today and tomorrow--the New Nuclear Navy. 
Cost of such a project would be small. The Navy has 
many supporters in the motion picture and television in-
dustries who will lend their services. In addition, in 
Hollywood there is a NRPRO largely composed of experts in 
the field who would be available. John Ford, for example, 
is a Reserve Rear Admiral and has worked on Navy films such 
as 11 The Sixth Fleet Story." Also, the Navy itself is loaded 
with ~-professional talent and the background of ships and 
foreign lands are easily available. 
This project would be especially effective in 
attracting recruits--for television is especially effective 
in reaching younger people. 156 But, as an important by-
product, such a program would be an ideal way to explain to 
the public the vast missLon of the Navy from the Far East to 
the Mediterranean. 
l56Ibid. 
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Conclusion 
This section closes the last of the 11 operating 
divisions" of the Office of Information. The three--
115 
public information, civil relations and internal relations--
have been discussed in detail. 
Two more sections of this chapter remain--Plans and 
Policy, and Security. They will now be discussed, following 
which there will be a summary of the recommendations made in 
this Chapter and their relationship to the mission and organ-
ization of Navy public relations and public information. 
VII. PLANS AND POLICY 
No military commander would dream of going into battle 
without a detailed operations order. Yet the public informa-
tion organization of the Navy conducts a world-wide program 
with little overall planning done due to. the pressing job of 
daily business. 
The Chief of Information is responsible for this 
world-wide program. The 1'Bible 11 of the program is the U. 6. 
Navy Public Information Manual, Yet, in the Manual there is 
but one paragraph devoted to the Planning responsibility of 
the Chief of Information. 
The Plans Division is an advisory and coordinating 
group which will formulate public information plans 
and policies; conduct research, and study of public 
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relations projects and problems and maintain liaison 
with the Army, Air Force, and Marine Corps on public 
information policy matters.l57 
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That some additions should be made in the planning of 
military public relations programs may be inferred from the 
fact that every report--with the exception of Coolidge 1 s 
security report--includes recommendations in this area. 
They covered general planning, coordination with departmental 
policy, inspections, public information objectives, research 
and war planning. 
Plans 
Recommendations 
1- A Plans Board should be created in the Office of 
Information.l58 
2- The Plans Board should develop plans, policies 
and objectives for a constructive public relations 
program--both external and internal.l59 
Discussion 
The formation of a plans board was the first recom-
mendation that Pratt made in his 11 Three Year Program for 
Navy Public Relations."l60 
The Planning Board would be composed of the Chief 
and Deputy Chief of Information, division directors, and 
157u. s. Navy Public Information Manual, Q2• cit., p. 13. 
158pratt, Navy Report, 22• cit., Part II, rec. 1. 
159pratt, Defense Report, 22• cit., rec. 4. 
160pratt, Navy Report, Q2• cit. 
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the Head of the News Origination Branch.l6l They would be 
given the responsibility of developing and reviewing plans 
and programs and advising the Secretary of the Navy and the 
Chief of Naval Operations--through the Chief of Information--
on proposed plans and objectives. 
After formulation of the plans, the Planning Division 
of Chinfo would continue to prepare the plans in: written 
form and to serve as project officers. 
Departmental Policy 
Recommendations 
1- The Chief of Information should participate in 
all Navy Department policy planning and decisions.l62 
2- The Chief of Information should be given time to 
prepare a public relations program before policy is 
broken in fact to the public, Congress and the Navy.l63 
Discussion 
Almost every decision made in the Pentagon has public 
relations connotations. It might be the closing of a naval 
air station--and the PR aspects would include the impact on 
the personnel assigned, the civilian workers, and the com-
muni ty. 
Or, it might be the ordering of a ship from the Atlantic 
to the Pacific. Again, public relations must think of the 
16lsee page 71 of this report. 
162Lockhart, £2• cit., Part I, para. 19. 
163Ibid. 
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impact on the crew and their families--plus the public informa-
tion news value. 
The Chief of Information should participate in these 
decisions. And, once the decision is made, he should have 
the Office of Information immediately commence to plan a public 
relatione program which will gain for the Navy the best pos-
sible public opinion--and overcome any objectionable features 
of the decision. 
As Lockhart states it: ''Explanation should set the 
stage for incident, not follow it tardily and weakly." 
Inspections 
Inspections are as old as military itself. Yet 
inspections have been foreign to the public relations field 
of the military. 
Recommendations 
1- A new division should be established in the Office 
of Information called the Inspection and Program 
Division.l64 
2- This new division would evaluate reports and 
progress made towards accomplishing public information 
objectives in the field.l65 
3- This division would provide an inspection system.l66 
4- Someone from Chinfo should be constantly traveling 
in the field.l6? 
164pratt, Navy Report, ~· cit., reo. 8 
165Ibid. 166Ibid. 
16?Lockhart, £E· cit., Part II, para. 26. 
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Discussion 
Inspections would have a four-fold purpose. First, 
they would point out to the commanders in the field what 
their PIO's should be doing. Second, they would evaluate the 
job being done by the field PI0 1 s. Third, they would show 
Chinfo the trouble spots which would allow the Chief of In-
formation to prepare counterattacks, and fourth, they would 
supply a feedback to Chinfo on Pentagon policies being im-
plemented in the field. 
These inspections--if the inspector is competent--
would provide a higher standard of performance by field PIO's. 
They would also ensure better coordination of activities be-
tween Washington and the field--an area where complaints are 
always plentiful.l68 In addition, they would stimulate the 
activities of the reserve units visited. 
One reason an inspection program has not been carried 
out in connection with Navy public relations has been the 
lack of a qualified inspection team. There have been few 
senior officers in the Navy experienced in public information. 
Those that were on duty could not be spared to become in-
spectors. However, as more experienced PIO officers work 
their way into the senior ranks, this no longer will be 
. 168pratt lists several complaints, while stating that 
11in every single instance there was hunger for help and direction 
from Washington," in discussing a survey he undertook while 
preparing his report. 
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a problem. 
"Inspections should be carried out," stated Admiral 
E. B. Taylor, USN, former chief of information.l69 
One additional task of the new Chinfo division would 
be the evaluation of reports submitted by field PI0 1 s. 
Presently there is no reporting system and one would have 
to be established. These would supplement and fill the 
interim period between inspections. 
Objectives 
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As pointed out in chapter VI, the Navy separates 
public information objectives from mission. Pratt had two 
recommendations in this field which pertain to Navy informa-
tion objectives. 
Recommendations 
1- A series of public relations objectives for the 
next three months should be adopted and revised at the 
end of that time.l70 
2- That the objective "Peacetime Role of the Navy" 
be made the subject of an Advertising Council project.l71 
Discussion 
The present Navy public information objectives were 
promulgated in July, 1956--nearly two years ago. These ob-
jectives are extremely general in nature. For example, the 
169statement by Rear Admiral Edmund B. Taylor, USN 1 
personal interview, Newport, Rhode Island, March, 1958. 
l70pratt, Navy Report, ~· cit., Part I, rec. 5. 
171Ibid., rec. 7. 
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one ''Public understanding of the Navy 1 s future role. 11 
Pratt envisions more specific, sharper objectives. 
Objectives which tie in with current naval policy, national 
policy and foreign policy. Ones which would lead the way 
better for the PIO in the field. 
Public relations to be effectiv~ must have objectives. 
However, as Pratt points out, the Navy must direct their public 
information objectives toward some "attainable" goals. 
Pratt also ties in the objectives with public opinion 
surveysol72 The Navy must disoover what they want to achieve. 
For example, to increase enlistments and reenlistments do they 
want to direct their campaign toward those in the service or 
outside persons? What is the opinion of the parents? Why are 
men leaving the service? Does the Navy have to create a favor-
able opinion of the service? Or, do they have to correct a 
negative attitude! 
Pratt also envisions the objectives as a measure of 
success for PI0 1 s. He states that the success of PI0 1 s in 
achieving public information objectives will measure their 
effectiveness. 
Commenting on his second recommendation, Pratt states:l?a 
If it is true that we must prevent the public from 
172statement of Laurence o. Pratt, personal interview, 
Cambridge, Massachusetts, May, 1958 
17aibid. 
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falling into the trap of prematurely relaxing the defense 
effort, it would be extremely helpful to have a back-
ground advertising campaign supporting the efforts of the 
Navy. 
Pratt also felt that to counteract in some measure 
interservice rivalry, it would be helpful to have the services 
coordinate their public information objectives. 
Research 
Except for the Air Farce, the entire public relations 
activity of the Department of Defense is proceeding with-
out any knowledge of public attitude. Information con-
cerning any slight downward trend in public approval for 
the size of the military establishment should be avail-
able at the earliest possible moment if we are to main-
tain our policy of stable military forces. This is a 
matter of national survival. Beyond this, a more de-
tailed ''estimate of the situation" based on scientifical-
ly collected data, is a must if we are to concentrate our 
public relations ammunition on constructive projects.l74 
Recommendations 
1- A research liaison officer should be appointed in 
the Plans Division of the Office of Information.l75 
2- The Navy League should be asked to adopt as one of 
its continuing projects the taking of semi-annual surveys 
of public opinion about the Navy--to be conducted by 
professional survey organ1zations.l76 
3- The NRPRC 1 s should be utilized to take a quick survey 
and report back to Washington in 48 hours.l77 
174pratt, Defense Report, £2• cit., rec. 4. 
175pratt, Navy Report, 22· cit., Part II, rec. 2. 
176shipman, ~· cit., p. 109. 
l77pratt, lac. £11• 
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Discussion 
A public relations program is good only when designed 
to attain specific objectives--as discussed above. However, 
it is impossible to determine exactly what these objectives 
should be without facts concerning existing attitudes and 
trends in attitudes. 
Armed with these facts, the Chief of Information is 
in a position to advise the Secretary of the Navy and the 
Chief of Naval Operations regarding the Navy's public inform-
ation program. 
A research program would consist of two areas: obtain-
ing the information and administering it. It would be the 
duty of the research liaison officer ~n the plans division to 
bring to bear on public relations planning and policy all 
available research within the Navy and the Armed Forces Re-
search Division. He would also work with the latter organi-
zation in the d,evelopment of new research projects to provide 
a factual basis for recommendations and a measure of effect-
iveness of Navy public relations undertakings. 
The public opinion surveys would have a second purpose--
the first being the ascertaining of current public opinion for 
the guidance of PR programs. This second function would be to 
answer the question of whether or not the Navy public relations 
program is succeeding. 
The main survey--to be financed by the Navy League--
would be every six months. Its results would be of help to 
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both the Navy and the Navy League in the pursuit of their ob-
jectiveso 
The second survey--by the NRPRC 1 s would of necessity 
be amateurish. However, some training could be given to 
members of the NRPRC 1 s--either by the visits of training offi-
cers thoroughly indoctrinated in survey procedures, or by 
the calling to training duty of certain selected reserve 
officerso 
Such a survey would serve a limited purpose--allowing 
Chinfo to get a pulse reading on the public's opinion at no 
expense. Reserve training credit could be given the parti-
cipants as remuneration. 
One word of caution is needed before leaving the subject 
of research. That is, that all too often research becomes an 
objective itself--and secondly, that research will provide no 
magic, pat answers to all the problems of Navy public 
relations.l78 
War Planning 
One more area needed investigation in the field of 
plans. Perhaps it is the most important. 
Recommendation 
1- The Chief of Information has an important present 
duty in relation to the future. He must prepare to 
178 Cutlip & Center, 22• cit., p. 483. 
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maintain public relations and continued support for the 
Navy when security is controlling.179 
Discussion 
Handling peacetime assignments and responsibilities 
and planning for war is a large and vital job. In other 
branches of the Navy Department there are special "war 
planning 11 branches. Within Chinfo, the Plans Division will 
have to assume the responsibility. 
Such a program means consideration and planning now for 
operations under war conditions. Subjects to be considered 
include: censorship, accreditation, information policies 
regarding POW's, security review, handling of communiques, 
and public relations problems concerning the man in uniformo 
These are problems which must be considered now for 
when war comes there is no time. Public relations would 
suffer accordingly. 
VIII. SECURITY 
The final section of this chapter deals with security 
and security review. Chinfo is responsible for only the 
latter 1 s policies, but also has ample occasion to apply the 
policies of the former. 
179 p 1 Lockhart, £2• cit., art I, para. 4. 
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Almost all the recommendations in the field of security 
and security review came from a report done by a committee 
headed by Charles A. Coolidge;80A few were made by Pratt in 
each of his two reports. 
At first blush it might seem that security and public 
information were at opposite ends of a continuum. However, 
this isn't true. Public information and security must--and 
do- -work hand in hand. Often times, however, this is a most 
difficult job. 
181 Vannevar Bush, speaking before the American society 
of Newspaper Editors, stated: 
There are factors of very great importance to the 
problem. Principal among these is our realization that 
the bulwark of the democratic process is an informed 
public opinion. The whole history of this country is 
a demonstration that the free exchange of ideas and 
complete accessibility of information are vital to the 
national welfare. 
The riddle wrapped up in a mystery inside of an 
enigma, then, is the problem of reconciling the preserva-
tion of the values inherent in the practice of full and 
free dissemination of fact with the common-sense require-
ment that we do not put into a potential enemy's hands 
information which will help him to kill our young men, 
devastate our cities, and overthrow our nation. The 
problem is that of distinguishing between information 
which rightly and properly belongs to every man--and 
180coolidge, ~· cit. 
l8lchairman, Research and Development Board and 
President, Carnegie Institution of Washington at the time. 
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information which for the safety and security of every 
man must be proteoted.l82 
Classification 
Recommendations 
1- Require that each program susceptible of such 
treatment contain a special paragraph dealing with in-
formation seourity.l83 
12? 
2- Give reasons for classification whenever possible 
when requests for information are denied.l84 
3- Cease attempts to classify information which can-
not be held seoret.l85 
4- Avoid changing the scope of classified information 
to reflect temporary changes in emphasis in our foreign 
policy.l86 
5- Make it wholly clear that the classification system 
is not to be used to prot,eot information not affecting 
the national security.l87 
Discussion 
It can easily be seen how closely "olassification"and 
public information tie in. A great majority of the subjects 
eventually released by the public information organization 
commenced life in a classified category. 
In Washington, it is fairly easy to ascertain if a 
specific piece of information has been classified. However, 
182vannevar Bush, (An address before the American 
Society of Newspaper Editors, Washington, D. C., April 16, 
1948) 
183coolidge, .2E.• cit., reo. 2. 
185Ibid., reo. 2. 186Ibid. 
184Ibid., reo. 8 
187Ibid. 
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if classified material were given a declassification date--
or happening of a certain event--automatically it would become 
available at that time for release. 
Outside of Washington this would be a tremendous step 
forward. For it is practically impossible for a field PIC 
to know what and when items may be declassified. 
Coolidge's recommendation concerning giving a reason 
whenever possible why an item is classified, ties in with 
Lockhart's one concerning the use of "no comment.ttl88 In 
making the explanation, Coolidge points out that it must be 
emphasized to the correspondents the difference of today 1 s 
11 cold war" and normal peacetime condi tiona. 
The last three recommendations deal with the admin-
istrative problems of classification--trying to keep an 
item classified when its existence is known by the public, 
constantly changing cla.ssification causing confusion, and 
denying the use of classification for security of adminis-
trative matters. 
Interviews 
Recommendation 
1- Arrange interviews through the Office of Informa-
tion with a representative sitting in on the interview.l89 
l88see p. 78 of this paper. 
189coolidge, ~· cit., reo. 8 
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Discussion 
Earlier in this report it was stated that all 
interviews should be arranged through the Office of In-
formation.l90 On that occasion the purpose of the recom-
mendation was to ensure that Chinfo knew who said what to 
whom. On this occasion, the Coolidge committee recommends 
it so that an informed PIO may assist the official being 
interviewed concerning security matters. Or, the PIO may 
assist the press representative in getting· some items de-
classified. 
Congressional 
Recommendation 
1- Care should be exercised in the publishing. of 
reports of proceedings before Congressional committees 
to eliminate sensitive technical data and classified 
operational concepts.l91 
Discussion 
129 
The Coolidge committee urged both branches of the 
government--Congress and the military--to keep in mind that 
unfriendly nations can glean a great deal of valuable in-
formation from the published reports of Congressional com-
mittees. To that end, the Navy should request Congressmen 
to clear classified Navy testimony with the Pentagon prior to 
release. 
190see p. 79 of this report 
191Ibid., reo. 7 
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Industry 
Recommendation 
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1- Steps should be taken to develop a better under-
standing in certain areas of industry of the hazard to 
national security resulting from disclosure of certain 
technical classified information.l92 
Discussion 
The Coolidge study reported that industry does a 
satisfactory job in protecting information except in one 
aspect. The exception is that in their desire to build up 
prestige, some companies give out damaging technical informa-
tion in their annual reports to stockholders, in advertisements, 
at business conferences and to trade and technical journals. 
This usually is in connection with new weapons. 
The Navy should conduct a public relations program to 
educate their contractors of the threat to national security 
such disclosure can cause. 
Security Review 
Security review is a direct responsibi~ity of the 
Office of Information. Following clearance on the depart-
mental level, material is submitted to the security review 
branch of the Office of Public Information in the Department 
of Defense for final clearance. 
192 Ibid., rec. 6. 
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Recommendations 
1- The responsibility for security review should be 
clearly defined and placed so far as is practicable in 
a single spot.l93 
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2- The entire responsibility for Naval security 
review should be vested in the appropriate Navy section. 194 
3- Under directives, guidelines and policies issued 
by the Office of Security Review in the Defense Depart-
ment, the Service review sections would be given primary 
responsibility for clearance for their own Service and 
for the Defense Department if no other service or gov-
ernmental agency was involved. The Defense Security 
office would coordinate the latter.l96 
4- Final clearances would still be given by the 
Defense Department Security Office which would initial 
a form placed on the material by the service section.l96 
5- Manufacturers desiring to obtain security checks 
should deal direct with the Service issuing the cont~ct, 
except where two or more services are involved.l97 
6- Greatest care should be taken in reviewing 
manuscripts from outside sources to refrain from editing 
or eliminating criticism.l98 
Discussion 
Pratt 1 s thesis is that there should be a single 
responsible authority for security review. Today if a 
security break occurs, the Defense Department may blame the 
193pratt, Defense Report, ~· cit., rec. 21. 
194pratt, Navy Report, £2• £!!., rec. 5. 
195pratt, Defense Report, £2• cit., reo. 22. 
196Ibid. 197Ibid., reo. 23. 198Ibid. 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
132 
service itself, or the service may blame the Defense Depart-
ment. There is split authority. What Pratt recommends is 
that security responsibility be concentrated in a single 
spot. This does not mean that it must be in the Defense 
Department. Eaoh service could have its own security re-
view facility. But that division would be the sole authority 
for releasing information. If there were a slip, the 
Service secretary would be held responsible. 
Having the Navy responsible for Navy olearanoe has 
another advantage. It overcomes the natural reluctance of 
some officers to deal with officers of other departments 
without the subject matter being transmitted through channels. 
A Chinfo officer oan deal with an operations officer by 
telephone. But, if the same officer were giving Navy clear-
ance to a Defense officer--regardless of what uniform the 
latter was wearing--he would be more inclined to request the 
paper be submitted via appropriate channels. 
Pratt's recommendation for manufacturers to deal direct 
with the service issuing the contract is based upon a.n Air 
Faroe test program. In this program it was indicated that 
the time for clearances to be obtained could be reduced by 
several weeks. This was probably due to the faot that the con-
cerned Service has something to gain by having the material 
receive fast consideration--whereas, the Defense Department 
does not. 
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In the last suggestion, Pratt aims at a practice that 
occasionally occurs, perhaps more in the field than in Wash-
ington. The publishing of detrimental matter is not a viola-
tion of security and should not be censored. Even if errors 
are found in the material they should not be deleted. Instead, 
a memorandum or oral communication should be directed to the 
originator making it clear that there is no security violation, 
but that there is an error. 
IX. SUMMARY 
More than 200 recommendations were reviewed in this 
study. Not all were discussed, some were omitted, others 
consolidated. In general, the recommendations proposed the 
following: 
commence a vigorous publio relations program, 
utilizing the best brains available. 
make the PIO corps a high trained, well qualified 
group. 
raise the status of Navy public relations, elevate 
the Chief of Information to Vice Admiral. 
increase the career incentive of PI0 1 s, make the 
Deputy Chief of Staff a Rear Admiral specialist (1650) -
placing a trained PIO in the Mfront office." 
have qualified PIO leader~as incompetents create 
problems. 
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-- screen non-specialists for PIO inclinations and 
aptitudes. 
reexamine the assignment policy for PI0 1 s. 
134 
continue to emphasize training in public relations. 
divide Chinfo into a dlimitations" and "non-
limitations" organization, and work toward elimination of 
the Congressional limitation. 
create a News Origination Branch. 
always be available with an authoritative, 
attributed answer to press queries. 
-- give more guidance to the field, in policy, 
photography, public relations, community relations. 
-- show more initiative in the photographic and 
magazine and book fields. 
programs. 
include top-notch enlisted personnel in speakers• 
participate more in community events. 
hold more open houses. 
exercise more control over internal publications. 
employ the cooperation of Naval Reserve Public 
Relations Companies more often. 
apply public relations principles to the 
enlistment and reenlistment problem. 
-- establish a Plans Board and commence more Navy-wide 
public relations planning. 
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-- advise top naval planners on public relations 
aspects of future plans. 
undertak~ an inspection program for public rela-
tiona. 
-- undertake public opinion surveys regarding the 
public's attitudes toward the Navy. 
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commence war planning for public relations. 
reexamine security policies and declassification 
r ules and regulations. 
undertake a public relations program in and for 
the Navy. 
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CHAPTER IX 
A NEW NAVY PUBLIC RELATIONS MISSION 
The recommendations covered in the preceding chapter 
are merely the means to the end--the end being a sound public 
relations policy. Any public relations program must, if it 
is to succeed, first be based on sound policy, then executed 
by capable personnel. 
This policy must be broader in scope than the old, 
worn-out "publicity" and would serve as a guide for the mill-
- -
tary in their relations--both external with the civilian 
universe and internal with the other members of the military. 
Navy public relations is a function of command that 
contributes to national security by evaluating public attitudes 
and executing a program of action through the efforts of every 
unit and individual in the Navy to cultivate and maintain: 
first, public understanding and appreciation of the Navy's 
missions and needs; second, the good will and cooperation of 
every individual and organization with whom the Navy deals 
externally in its day to day operations; third, high internal 
Navy morale, and, fourth, the respect and understanding of 
the people abroad for the government and t~e people of the 
United States.l 
lcanfield, 22• cit., p. 396. 
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I. THE MISSION 
Navy public relations must: 
1- ascertain the attitudes of the public toward 
the Navy and seapower. 
2- ascertain the level of knowledge the public has of 
seapower, the New Nuclear Navy, and the role of the Navy in 
implementing national policy. 
~· 
3- instill in every individual in the Navy the true 
meaning of public relations and the benefits which they and 
the Navy can attain by the employment of public relations. 
4- conduct a vigorous information program to educate 
the publics--internal, external and foreign--on the capabili-
ties of the New Nuclear Navy. 
5- inform the public of the advantages a naval career 
offers in the New Nuclear Navy. 
6- examine policy made in the Navy for its public 
relations implications. 
II. IMPLEMENTATION 
In any organization you've got to stop the big 
thoughts, you've got to stop the abstract thinking, 
and you've got to get down and produce some results.2 
2Milton Fairman, Director of Public Relations, Borden 
Company, dWhat is Public Relations,M A Public Relations 
Program (Pensacola: Naval Air Station, 1950), p. 16. 
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The first step in implementing the Navy's public 
relations program is ~education." Each individual must be 
educated on what public relations is and how to use it. This 
can be done by word of mouth, by PIC's and by the written 
word. 
There is currently a public information correspondence 
course. This should not be cancelled. Instead, it should be 
altered to contain the concept of public relations--including 
human relationso 
The second step in implementation is to have an organ-
ization of "public relations" officers and enlisted men in the 
Navy. One of the most difficult problems to be overcome in 
carrying out the Navy's public relations program on a long-
range basis is the shortage of qualified personnel. To do 
an effective job in this field, an officer must possess both 
a sound knowledge of naval operations and policies, and a 
thorough acquaintance with public relations techniques. 
Officers combining these qualities are in short supply. 
The next problem an implementer faces is getting the 
word concerning the New Nuclear Navy to the public. 
The most imaginative and skillful public relations 
counselor has his work cut out for him when he tries 
to convey to the American people either by word or 
picture the Navy's contribution to national security. 
The very nature of the fluid and complex maritime 
operations makes it difficult. For example, it is 
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hard to portray the true effectiveness of such a 
weapons syatem as the carrier task force. Its pre-
cision, complexity, and power must be seen to be 
appreciatedo3 
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This could be stated "Just how are you going to explain 
the physical appearance, capability and need for a nuclear 
powered Forrestal aircraft carrier to a housewife in Box 
Elder, South Dakota?" Navy public relations faces the 
gigantic problem of translating into understandable terms the 
job the New Nuclear Navy is doing today and the greater job 
it will be doing tomorrow. 
III. SUMMARY 
The mission of Navy public relations can be summed up 
as follows: educate and implement. 
Educate the Navy, the American public, and foreign 
friends--and enemies. For the Navy, education is two-fold--
educate them concerning public relations and concerning the 
New Nuclear Navyo 
Implement the education program. Implement the conduct 
of the concept of public relations in all dealings with people. 
One other quote of Admiral Carney concludes this 
chapter: 
As far as the Navy of the ~esent and future is 
concerned, it is obvious that if we are to retain our 
3carney, 11Military Public Relations," op. cit. 
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hard-won ranking as the world's ·number one sea power, 
we have more than a 11 doing" job; we have a "telling" job as well. And because of the crying need to 
develop new and better weapons, to recruit and train 
new people, to retain the good people we already have, 
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to build new ships to keep pace with the rapidly changing 
technology of this new atomic era, we must take what 
effort and time is required to stay on an operating 
frequency with the people we serve. 
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CHAPTER X 
CONCLUSIONS 
I. RELATING THE RECOMMENDATIONS 
What must be done to carry out the education and 
implementation necessary under the Navy's public relations 
program for the New Nuclear Navy? 
This thesis reviewed the civilian public relations 
recommendations. At this point, in conclusion._ , t hese 
studies should be related to the new mission. 
Perhaps of greatest importance is for the l~favy to 
recognize "public relationsn and to differentiate between 
public information and public relations. In line with this, 
the Navy should: 
1- Creat~ a new division entitled Office of Public 
Relations. 
2- Make the present Chief of Information a Vice 
Admiral and designate him "Deputy Chief of Nav-al Opera-
tions for Public Relations'' and "Chief of Information." 
3- Submit a separate budget for public relations. 
4- Add a U. s. Navy Public Relations manual to the 
present u. s. Navy Public Information manual. 
To have an effective public relations--and public 
information--program, the Navy must have a well tl~·ained, 
well qualified public relations corps. Otherwise it is a 
vicious circle. Poor public relations personnel do a poor 
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job 1 the program is a failure 1 new qualified persc)nnel reject 
membership 1 the program gets worse 1 and finally, the Navy 
says the PR program is not accomplishing anything, let 1 s 
abandon it. Therefore, the Navy should: 
5- Create a strong, career-bound, public r ·elations 
personnel corps 1 through offering suitable and appropriate 
incentives such as promotion and assignment to responsible 
duties. 
6- Broaden public relations training in schools 1 in 
the fleet, in the shore establishment. 
7- Ensure that all present PIO's are well grounded 
in the fundamentals of public relations. 
The second area in which emphasis should be placed in 
the new public relations program is plans. This ~Ls closely 
tied in with public opinion surveys. The Navy must ascertain 
current public opinion on the various aspects of 1;he Navy, and 
then plan to change--or reenforce these attitudes. They should: 
8- Take--or have taken--frequent public oplnion surveys 
on various subjects such as the role of the Navy in nation-
al defense, reenlistment 1 etc. 
9- Commence a long-range, world-wide, Navy-·to~ide public 
relations planning. 
Third, the Navy must exercise public relations in every 
act it conducts. They must: 
10- Employ public relations in all contacts with the 
public and the media. 
11- Employ public relations in all contacts with 
foreign nationals. 
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12- Strengthen the Navy's community relations program. 
Show the New Nuclear Navy to the grassroots--.. ei ther in 
person or via such media as television. 
13- Strengthen internal relations such as the new 
habitability being incorporated into ships. 
There are also some areas of Public Information which 
should be modified. To that end, it is recommended that the 
suggestions contained in this thesis be closely examined and, 
if possible, adopted. 
The Navy's peacetime role should be stressed. 
14- Publicity should be given to the peacetime 
accomplishments--other than the 11 showing the Fla g 11 
enforcing national policy. Such jobs as Antarctic 
expeditions, Naval Observatory work, naval medical 
research, rescue work, etc. 
And finally, the Navy should seek out assi.stance from 
those civilian experts who would be only too willing to give 
guidance. They should: 
15- Estab:lish a · Civilian Public Relations .~dvisory 
Board, to be composed of top-notch public relations 
experts--with Navy experience if possible--who woul·a 
act as a Board of Visitors, evaluating the Navy's 
public relations program and lending advice and support. 
II. FURTHER AREAS TO BE INVESTIGATED 
Certain aspects of Navy public relations ~rere unex-
plainably avoided in the five reports studied in this thesis. 
It could not have been because they were unimport;a.nt because 
their importance is high. 
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A researcher, for example, should investigate the 
community relations problem regarding naval air :s: tations. 
The Air Force lists this as their number one co~nunity rela-
tions problem--especially since jets have arrived on the 
scene. 
Another area that bears investigation is the enlist-
ment-reenlistment problem. Why does a man enlist; in one 
service and not another? Why does one man reenl:l.st and not 
another? What are the public relations problems connected 
with these answers? 
Exercises and operations should be investigated for 
public information implications. Here is the on•; time that 
the working press get to see the Navy in full ac1;ion. What 
are the attitudes and opinions of the media toward the conduct 
of these maneuvers? • o. toward the handling of thE3 press? 1)00 
toward the selling job the Navy does? ••• toward 1;he need for 
the New Nuclear Navy? 
An~ most importantly, what does the Navy PIO think 
about a career in the Navy? Is there any incentlve for such 
a career--promotion, rank, responsible PIO assignments? Or, 
does the PIO feel that he can never attain statu~:1 because he 
is not an unrestricted line officer--even if the statue 
desired is in the public relatione field? 
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Lastly, why not have a study made of Navy public re-
lations and public information--not by a civilian expert, not 
by a regular Navy line officer--but by , a regular Navy publi.c 
information specialist. The latter may be the b1E1 St qualified. 
He knows the Navy, he knows public relations, he knows why 
some concepts will work in the Navy and why othe r s won't. He 
knows how to solve the problems. Let the PIO do a survey and 
then let him implement his recommendations. The results 
might be surprising. 
There is one last fact that this study brought out 
which should be mentioned. 
It is often said that many officers shy away from 
public information duty, would take any assignmeJr:tt but that 
of a PIO. It is felt that such duty drives a nai. l in the 
coffin of their career. 
It is interesting to note that those who have foreseen 
the potential of public relations--and in some cases been 
''ploneerstt in military public relations, have no 't had their 
careers stifled. In fact, they made out rather 1~tell: 
1916- first Army press release officer --
General Douglas MacArthur. 
1927- first officer to send ~ess reports ashore 
during naval battle maneuvers -- Admiral Robi~rt B. Carney. 
1935- Chief of the Information Division it:f the O.Ffice 
of Chief of Air Service, War Department --
General Hap Arnold. 
1946- Director of Information, War Department 
General J. Lawton Collins. 
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III. IN RETROSPECT 
The Navy public relations program of 1958 has made 
incomparable strides over the program of twenty years ago, 
as have naval weapons. As the latter expand vislbly from 
day to day, it is hoped that naval public relations will 
expand. That in one year, more will be accomplished than 
was accomplished in a decade. 
Navy public relations will skyrocket ahead with the 
New Nuclear Navy--the result will be a better Navy, a 
stronger Navy, a more effective Navy--not only in the 
material things, but in the human abstractions. 
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APPENDIX A 
PUBLIC RELATIONS MISSIONS OF 
THE ARMY, AIR FORCE AND MARINE CORPS 
I. ARMY 
The United States Army has an obligation to report 
on its activities to the American people. In ordHr that 
they be continuously informed of the activities and ac-
c omplishments of the Army, it is essential that, <}onsistent 
with military security, the American people be giv·en factual 
information relating to the--
(1) missions and objectives of the Army and their 
support of national aims. 
(2) programs and accomplishments of the Arr.ay, in 
the Unite~ States and overseas areas. 
(3) utilization of funds appropriated by Ce>ngress. 
(4) continuous effort of the Army to provide 
weapons, ~eapons systems, training, equipment, methods, 
and techniques having a margin of superiority whic~h will 
assure success in battle. 
(5) necessity for maintaining an Army of sufficient 
strength ~o meet the requirements of national security, 
including oversea commitments. 
( 6) relationship of the Army to the Americl:m people. 
(7) present and future requirements of the Army in 
men, money and materials. 
(8) role of the Army in relation to the other 
services in protecting the nation. 
(9) identification of leaders and accomplishments of 
individuals and units. 
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(10) activities in the public interest, to include 
resulting public benefits. 
, (11) opportunities for advancement, individual 
developmen~, and financial security afforded by the Army. 
(12) the role of the reserve components in national 
defense ang. their need for continuous public support, par-
ticularly at the community level. 
In accomplishing these objectives, sound principles 
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of community relations, press relations, and publlc relations 
will be observed. Commanders will take cognizance! of the 
fact that publicity is only one element of any public rela-
tions program and will insure that members of thelr commands 
fully realize that each member of the Army shares in responsi-
bility for individual maintenance of public confidence and 
support. Emphasis will be placed on the fact tha1; such things 
as good human relations, good performance and an individual 
code of honorable conduct form the foundation of favorable 
public opinion.l 
AIR FORCE 
To fulfill the requirements imposed by our obligations 
to the American people and to the personnel of the Air Force, 
the information program is dedicated to the following over-all 
objectives: 
1. To attain universal comprehension of the nature of 
the threat endangering the security of the United States and 
the free l'lorld. 
2. To develop a program designed to give every member 
of the Air Force an understanding of airpower. 
3. To insure consistency of expression by the Air 
Force personnel on matters of policy, doctrine, and concept 
when acting in an official capacity with the publlc. 
1Public Information--General Policies, Department of 
the Army, Army Regulations No. 360-5 (Washington: Government 
Printing Office, 1956) 1 pp. 12-13. 
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4. To explain to the American public the manner in 
which the Air Force can efficiently cope with the d.emands of 
national security in periods of tension and in global war. 
5. To provide Air Force personnel and the American 
people with an understanding of the dominant role of airpower 
in international relations, particularly an appreclation of 
the role of United States airpower in United States foreign 
relations. 
6. To promote an understanding of the fundamentals 
of modern war. The information services program operates 
within three major areas of activity to accomplish the ob-jectives outlined above: Internal information, public 
information and community relations.2 . 
MARINE CORPS 
1 .. The information services mission of the Marine 
Corps is to: 
a. Keep the public informed: 
(1) of Marine Corps missions, organization 
and performance 9f assigned tasks. 
(2) in support of personnel procurement. 
b. Keep Marines informed: 
(1) of the nature of service in the Oorps. 
(2) of the activities of the Corps and of 
the command to w~ich attached.3 
2Air Force Information Services Manual (Washington: 
Department of the Air Force, 1956), pp. 1-2. 
3u. S. Marine Corps Informational Services Manual 
(Washingtong Government Printing Office, 1955) p. 1-2. 
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APPENDIX B 
RESPONSIBILITIES OF DIVISIONS 
OFFICE OF INFORMATION, NAVY DEPARTMENT 
Chief of Information 
The Chief of Information is designated as the direct 
representative of the Secretary of the Navy and of the Chief 
of Naval Operations in all matters of public information. As 
such, he shall be consulted concerning the public lnformation 
aspects of proposed naval plans and policies. 
In exercising this responsibility the Chief of Informa-
tion shall: 
(a) Advise the Secretary of the Navy and the Chief of 
Naval Operations on matters of policy relating to public 
understanding and support of the Navy; on policies and 
methods relative to public relations and dissemination of 
information; on public information aspects of operations and 
activities. 
(b) Coordinate the public information policies and 
programs 9f the Navy and Marine Corps. 
(c) Impart to the personnel of the Navy, in1Jluding 
the reserve components thereof, appropriate information on 
current policies and programs of the Navy Department. 
(d) Promulgate instructions as necessary and appro-
priate fo:;" the conduct and implementation of publlc informa-
tion programs throughout the Naval Establishment. 
(e) Collect, evaluate, coordinate and disse1minate 
information of national importance originating within the 
fleet commands and the Shore Establishment. 
(f) Originate and disseminate, through proper channels, 
information material developing within the Navy Department. 
(g) Coordinate and develop channels between the Navy 
and the public for accomplishment of the Navy's mission.~ 
lu. S. Navy Public Information Manual, ~· ,cit., p. 7. 
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Deputy Chief of Information 
The Deputy Chief of Infor.rna ti on is the prineiple 
assistant to the Chief of Information, and will act as his 
deputy and chief of staff. He will coordinate the activi-
ties of the component divisions and offices of the Office of 
Inf ormationo 
Specl.al Deputy 
The Special Deputy is responsible to the Ch.:l.ef of 
Information for such information projects and programs as 
may be assigned. 
Planning Division 
The Planning Division is an advisory and coordinating 
group which will formulate public information plans and 
policies; conduct research, and study of public relations 
and problems and maintain liaison with the Army, A.lr Force 
and Marine Corps on public information policy matters. 
Administrative Division 
The Administrative Division will administer the Office 
of Information in a manner which will facilitate tJ~e effective 
and expeditious conduct of business in that office :; insure 
that classified mail and files are handled in accordance with 
existing regulations; prepare and maintain budgetary records 
on all public information acti vi tie·s of the Navy, and coordi-
nate the assignment and rotation of public information 
personnelo 
Public Information Division 
The Public Information Division will originate and 
disseminate Navy Department information material through 
authorized channels; answer queries emanating from al.l. public 
media and government agencies; maintain operational 11.a1son 
with the Media Divisions, Office of Public Information, 
Department of Defense; arrange and process authorization, 
accreditation and travel of media correspondents; make 
arrangements for special events of interest to media. 
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Civil Relations Division 
The Civil Relations Division will administer the 
Navy Community Relations Program and the Navy Gues·t Cruise 
Program; coordinate special orientation visits of lndivi-
dual civilians or groups to naval installations; maintain 
liaison with and conduct programs of cooperation wlth all 
civilian groups and nongovernmental agencies which do not 
fall within the category of public information medla, and 
answer queries emanating from the general public. 
Internal Relations Division 
The Internal Relations Division will effect appro-
priate liaison and coordination with the bureaus a nd offices 
of the Navy Department, and between the Department and all 
commands afloat and ashore, other government agenc:l.es, and 
with the Army and Air Force on other than policy matters; 
asemble and disseminate public information policie1E1 1 pro-grams and material originating within the Navy Depa.rtment to 
all naval personnel; and, plan and administer the Volunteer 
Reserve Public Relations Program. . (Now known as N;s.val 
Reserve Public Relations Program.)2 
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APPENDIX C 
ACTIVITIES INCLUDED IN THE LIMITATION ON 
PUBLIC INFORMATION AND PUBLIC RELATIONS 
Pay and allowances of all personnel, includlng 
secretarial and clerical, both military and civilian, en-
gaged in the activities indicated below, are included in 
the limitation on funds expendable for public information 
and public relations as imposed by Congress. The applicable 
share of pay and allowances of personnel engaged in this work 
on a part-time basis will also be included. 
For the purpose of costing, and except as ·excluded 
below, public information and public relations activities 
include: 
(1) preparation of material (whether voluntary or 
upon specific request) for distribution to, and of:E'icial 
contacts with representatives of, non-governmental publica-
tions. 
(2) preparation of material (whether voluntary or 
upon specific request) for radio and television broadcasting 
purposes, and official contacts with broadcasting representa-
tives. 
(3) preparation and publication of advertisements in 
any form whether paid or free. 
(4) preparation, installation, presentation and 
circulatiqn (including packing, crating and transporting) 
of exhibits, except those for internal use, procurement 
purposes, or civilian contractor plant morale and incentive 
purposes. 
(5) production and presentation of motion plctures 
and film strips, except those for internal use within the 
Government. 
(&) preparation and printing of publications other 
than those required by law or those issued primarily for 
internal use in the Government. 
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The following activities are excluded: 
( 1) time of civilian and mill tary officialEJ (other 
than those having public information or public relations 
as a specific responsibility) who, by virtue of their 
offices, are called upon to participate in such ac~tivities. 
(2) time of personnel devoted to such matters as 
accounting, personnel records, or supply for publlc infor-
mation or public relations activities. 
(3) time of personnel whose work is devoted to 
publicati<;ms required by law, or those primarily f'or use 
within the Government. 
(4) answeri.ng correspondence and inquiries from the 
public, o~ participating in meetings intended to answer 
questions from the public. 
(5) issuance of interpretations of regulations, orders 
issued under the Administrative Procedures Act, etc. 
( 6) time of personnel at It open-house" presentations 
at military installations, participating in parades, musical 
concerts and demonstrations. 
( 7) advertisements, exhibits 1 films, film s·~rips or 
publications relating to acquisition of government property, 
or recruitment or employment of government personnel.l 
10ffice of Information, Navy Department, Administration 
of funds for public information and public relat~~ activi-
ties, Report Symbol EXOS 7330-2 1 OHINFO Instruction 7330.10 
twaS'hington: Defense Printing Office, 1957), pp. 2··3. 
